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Significant controversy surrounds the issuance of legal oplnzons in 
structured-finance transactions, particularly where accountants separately use 
these opinions, beyond their traditional primary use, for determining whether to 
characterize the transactions as debt. Reflecting at its core the unresolved 
boundaries between public and private in financial transactions, this controversy 
raises important issues of first impression: To what extent, for example, should 
lawyers be able to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities? 
Furthermore, what should differentiate the roles of lawyers and accountants in 
disclosing information to investors? Resolution of these issues not only helps to 
demystifY the mystique, and untangle the morass, of legal opinion giving, it also 
affects the very viability of the securitization industry, which dominates American, 
and increasingly global, financing. 
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In a vital area of finance, lawyers are being increasingly criticized, 1 and 
sometimes even threatened with liability/ for issuing traditionally required 
legal opinion letters. 3 Although their primary use is to assure investors and 
rating agencies on bankruptcy issues,4 these so-called "true sale" and 
"nonconsolidation" opinions are often separately used by accountants for 
advising that structured-finance transactions5 should be characterized, in a 
company's financial statements, as "off-balance-sheet financing" rather than 
debt. 6 The former characterization allows a transaction to be accounted for as 
I. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1094-95 (2004) (observing that "none of these [complex financial 
manipulations] could have been consummated without the assistance of sophisticated, elite law 
firms, which had to render legal opinions known as 'true sale' opinions and 'nonconsolidation' 
opinions"); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 
COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1242-43 (2003) (criticizing the bar for issuing structured-finance opinions in 
transactions that later turned out to be accounting shams); Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, 
BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58 ("By writing those opinion letters, attorneys blessed several 
transactions now being attacked as deceptive."). Cf Nathan Koppel, Wearing Blinders, 26 AM. 
LAW. 75, 166--68 (July 2004) (suggesting that, even beyond conspiracy claims, the lawyers in 
Dynegy lnc.'s "Project Alpha" structured transaction deserve blame for failure to properly account 
for Project Alpha as debt). Professor Deborah Rhode of Stanford Law School likewise argues that 
lawyers should be sensitive to the possibility that their opinions may be used for fraudulent 
purposes. Id. at 164. Professor George Cohen of the University of Virginia School of Law 
similarly contends that, regardless of the accountant's role in the matter, "it is the lawyers' 
obligation to [ask] ... 'Is this fraudulent? [s this deal designed to mislead investors?'" Id. at 168. 
2. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549,692 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) (refusing to dismiss claims against a law firm when the complaint alleged, among other 
things, that the law firm issued true sale opinions necessary to effectuate the client's allegedly 
fraudulent plan). Cf Carrie Johnson, Lawyers in the Limelight, SEC Helps Police Their 
Misconduct, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at EOI (suggesting, among other things, that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission will more aggressively file civil charges against lawyers). 
3. This Article uses the terms "legal opinion letters," "legal opinions," and "opinions" 
interchangeably. For a discussion of the nature of legal opinions, see infra notes 42-70 and 
accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
5. See irifra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (describing structured-finance transactions). 
6. Generally accepted accounting principles, or "GAAP," require these opinions for an 
accountant to certifY a transaction as off-balance-sheet. See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND 
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. 
Accounting Standards No. 140, ~ 21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter F AS 140]; 
AU Section 9336, Interpretation of AU Section 336, Using the Work of a Specialist (Am. Inst. of 
Certified Pub. Accountants 200 I) (requiring evidence of whether a transaction would be described 
as a true sale to be considered). In practice, this can result in the substitution of legal opinions for 
accountants' exercise of fully independent judgment (as was required in the past under Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 77) in determining whether financial assets have been sold. The resulting 
dual-information problem exacerbates, but is not the core reason for, the information failure this 
Article ultimately identifies as most problematic. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text. 
Although the question of whether accountants should be permitted to rely on legal opinions in 
making accounting determinations is beyond this Article's scope, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (F AS B) recently raised the possibility of severing the accounting from the legal 
determination under FAS 140. See Memorandum from the Statement 140 Amendment Team to the 
Members of the Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www. 
fasb.org/board_meeting_minutes/09-22-04_qspe.pdf (providing the minutes of the Sept. 24, 2004 
board meeting, which clarified that accountants meet the isolation requirement by determining that a 
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a sale of assets and not a borrowing-the rationale being that the assets are (as 
the opinions provide) legally sold by the company to a separate entity,7 and 
even bankruptcy of the company will not reverse that sale or allow a court to 
consolidate the assets of the company and that separate entity.8 Thus, the 
company engaging in the transaction does not have to show additional debt on 
its balance sheet.9 
Structured-finance transactions include securitization, project finance, and 
similar transactions in which companies originating fmancial assets, such as 
accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals, utilize special-purpose vehicles 
(SPVs, sometimes referred to interchangeably as special-purpose entities or 
SPEs) to facilitate the transaction. In a typical securitization transaction, for 
example, the company (sometimes referred to as the "originator") sells rights 
to payment from the financial assets to a wholly owned SPY, which in turn 
transfers these rights to an independent SPY, which in turn issues securities to 
capital market investors. The independent Spy uses the proceeds of the 
issuance to pay the first Spy for the financial assets, and the first SPY then 
uses those proceeds to pay the originator. The investors, who are repaid from 
collections of the fmancial assets, buy the securities based on their assessments 
of the value of the financial assets. 10 
transaction would be supported by a legal opinion if one were requested). There is also precedent in 
the corporate disclosure area for attorneys and accountants to work together to reach a mutually 
acceptable agreement on the extent to which accountants can rely on legal opinions. See 
ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, ~ 36 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FAS 5] (noting that the advice oflegal counsel should 
be taken into consideration when determining whether the condition for a loss accrual is met). Any 
change in this practice is likely to occur through a treaty approach or a change in GAAP, because 
FAS 140 still requires accountants to rely on structured-finance opinions. As such, individual 
attorneys or law firms will be reluctant to withhold such opinions, as they would risk being fired (or 
not rehired) by their originator clients. 
7. This separate entity being one or more special-purpose vehicles, or SPVs, as described in the 
next paragraph. 
8. The true sale opinion provides that the assets should be treated as legally sold, under 
bankruptcy law, by the company to that separate entity; the nonconsolidation opinion provides that 
even the company's bankruptcy should not allow a court to consolidate the assets of the company 
and that separate entity. Opinions are needed because structured-fmance transactions could be 
viewed as either sales or secured loans under bankruptcy law, depending on their facts. STEVEN L. 
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 
§ 4: I, at 4-3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2005). 
9. This use of structured-finance transactions is sometimes seen as a form of "earnings 
management." See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for 
"Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetic, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 160 (1997) 
(discussing off-balance-sheet financing as a type of earnings management). 
10. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. I, 
6 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Irrationality]. For a more complete analysis of securitization, see 
SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § I: I, at 1-5 (noting that prospective buyers of SPY -issued securities look 
to the cash flow of the SPY -owned receivables backing those securities rather than to the credit of 
the company originating those receivables), and Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset 
Securitization, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy]. For a 
discussion of other (including inappropriate) uses of SPVs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the 
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Structured-fmance transactions that are used to raise money off-balance-
sheet are not inherently bad, and indeed can have important benefits, such as 
better allocating risk with assets. II However, they also can mask liabilities that 
only first become evident when a company goes bankrupt. Say, for example, a 
company is able to characterize a transaction as a sale with contingent 
recourse,12 which otherwise (but less appropriately) would be viewed as 
balance-sheet debt. 13 In a sale transaction, the contingent recourse only needs 
to be shown on the company's balance sheet if the contingency is "probable.,,14 
Although diligent investors would learn of contingent liabilities by reading the 
footnotes to the balance sheetl5-such liabilities must be disclosed in those 
footnotes if the contingency is merely a "reasonable possibility,,16-investors 
often focus exclusively on the balance sheet itself without regard to risks 
disclosed in the footnotes. 17 They therefore often fail to anticipate that, in a 
Use and Abuse o/Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309 (2002) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Enron]. 
II. Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (arguing, based on a pronouncement by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, that "transfer of risk is, and should be, central to the 
accounting determination"). 
12. This is a sale where the SPY buyer has recourse (e.g., under warranties) against the 
originator under mutually agreed to circumstances. The existence of contingent recourse against the 
originator is not necessarily inconsistent with the observation, supra note II, that transfer of risk is 
central to the accounting determination. In all structured-finance transactions, the originator (i.e., 
the company transferring financial assets to the SPY) retains, and on an arm's-length basis must 
retain, first-loss risk on those assets to compensate for the information asymmetry between those 
parties. Id at 1316 n.38. 
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
14. FAS 5, supra note 6, "i["i[8-13 (requiring balance sheet disclosure only of "probable" 
contingent risks). 
15. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1539, 1556 
n.87 (2004) ("Post-Enron, no reasonable investor can claim ignorance of financial statement 
footnotes; investors have been widely educated to carefully review those footnotes as part of their 
investment or credit decisions."). 
16. FAS 5, supra note 6, at 6 (allowing only remote risks to remain undisclosed). Moreover, 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, F ASB INTERPRETATION No. 45 "i[9 (2002) requires 
guarantors to at least recognize on their balance sheets a liability for the fair value of the guarantee 
obligation. See also § 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745, 785 (2002) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.). Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to 
maximize GAAP disclosure of contingent liabilities by amending § 13 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m (2005». It adds a subsection (j), requiring the SEC to issue the 
following: 
Final rules providing that each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed 
with the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions, 
arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of 
the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material 
current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of 
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components 
of revenues or expenses. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(j). 
17. Cf Anne Tergesen, The Fine Print: How to Read Those Key Footnotes, Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 
2002, at 94, 94-95 (Investors "could have had a heads-up that all was not quite right at [Enron] long 
before the bad news broke in October. The source of this information? The footnotes companies 
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bankruptcy, contingent recourse may be asserted as a claim against the 
company.18 
Nonetheless, true sale and nonconsolidation opinions-the legal opinions 
most commonly associated with off-balance-sheet financing l9-are frequently 
issued by most major law firms.20 These opinions (hereinafter, "structured-
finance opinions") address only bankruptcy law issues and make no accounting 
analysis.21 Indeed, their primary as well as historical purpose is to assure 
investors and rating agencies22 that the structure of the Spy transaction is 
are required to publish with their financial statements .... Footnotes do not make for easy reading, 
however, and the numbers are often difficult to decipher."). 
18. One commentator suggested that the problem of possible investor failure to anticipate 
contingent recourse could be remedied by disclosing structured-fmance transactions, including any 
associated contingent recourse, more prominently than in footnotes-perhaps even as a separate 
accounting category. I disagree. That disclosure would remove the "filter" effect that occurs when 
an accountant makes an informed assessment of the transaction and associated recourse, resulting in 
an information dump that would make it harder, not easier, for investors to make informed 
investment decisions. If the mere existence of contingent recourse were prominently disclosed, 
investors would have insufficient information to assess the risk, often misleading investors into 
believing that the company is riskier than it really is. Neither approach is likely to achieve a fair 
presentation of the company's financial condition. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm in a World o/Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 16-17 (citations omitted): 
One therefore might ask whether structured-transaction disclosure could be reduced, in 
at least certain cases, to easy-to-understand elements like contingent recourse against 
the originator. This has an apparent simplicity: assess the risk that an originator will 
become liable for any contingent liabilities, and then include those liabilities, or a risk-
discounted portion thereof, in the originator's financial statements. This approach, 
however, would suffer from at least the same problems that a similar approach suffers 
in derivatives disclosure: it is impossible ex ante to precisely assess the risks, whereas 
a worst-case disclosure overemphasizes unlikely risks while potentially ignoring risks 
that are more realistic .... [T]here are no shortcuts to remedying disclosure's 
insufficiency. 
Moreover, even if more prominent disclosure were a solution, my Article is normative and does not 
purport to solve that problem per se. Rather, I use that problem only to illustrate the urgent need to 
better understand legal opinions. 
19. See supra notes 5-6. 
20. E-mail from Edward M. De Sear, Securitization and Structured-Finance Partner, McKee 
Nelson LLP, to author (Apr. 15,2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter De Sear E-mail]. 
21. True sale and nonconsolidation are solely issues of bankruptcy law. SCHWARCZ, supra note 
8, § 3:4, at 3-22; § 4: I, at 4-2. Thus, the "consolidation" referred to in a nonconsolidation opinion 
solely concerns whether an originator and the Spy with which it is transacting would be 
substantively consolidated or regarded as a single legal entity under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code 
for purposes of allocating the priority of claims against assets. Id. § 4: II, at 4-38; § 4: 12.3, at 4-50 
(noting that, under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, "substantive consolidation treats [the SYP and 
the originator] as the same entity in bankruptcy"). Accounting consolidation, in contrast, solely 
concerns whether that Spy's assets and liabilities should be included in the consolidated financial 
statements of the originator. Id. § 7:4. 
22. Rating agencies are private companies that assess, or "rate," the risks associated with the 
full and timely payment of debt securities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering 0/ Public 
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 2-3 (2002). Investors rely on the 
rating based on the rating agency's reputation. Presently, the most reputable rating agencies are 
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch Investors Service, 
Inc. Id. at 6-7. "Because a high rating signals low credit risk to investors, a company that issues 
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"bankruptcy remote.,,23 Furthermore, these opinions typically are-and, for 
purposes of the following discussion, initially will be assumed to be (although 
I later relax this assumption24)-technically correct as to the legal matters they 
purport to cover?S 
Note that this Article's scenario must be distinguished from cases where 
lawyers issue legal opinions intended to be used to facilitate accounting or 
bankruptcy fraud.26 Although structured-finance opinions address bankruptcy 
law issues, such opinions typically are given at a time when bankruptcy is 
perceived merely as a theoretical possibility, not as a likely risk.27 Similarly, 
although structured-finance opinions are complex and require a great deal of 
sophistication on the part of counsel,28 there is nothing inherently deceptive or 
illegal about them or the structured-finance transactions on which they opine.29 
[highly rated] secuntJes can-other things being equal-more easily attract investors for its 
securities than can a company that issues lower rated securities. Therefore, the company with 
highly rated securities can pay a lower interest rate on those securities, and still attract investors, 
than can the company with the lower rated securities." Id. at 8. 
23. See, e.g., Christopher Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TvL. L. 
REv. 101, 122 (1997) (explaining that rating agencies typically require opinion letters from 
originator's counsel "stating that the Spy likely will not be substantively consolidated with the 
originator and that the transaction will effectively remove the assets from originator's bankruptcy 
estate"). For a discussion of "bankruptcy remoteness," see SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 3. 
24. See infra notes 248-64 and accompanying text. 
25. De Sear E-mail, supra note 20 (observing that he has "no reason to doubt the technical 
correctness of the true sale and nonconsolidation opinions that are rendered by law firms that are 
nationally recognized in the area of structured finance"). 
26. See 10hn P. Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.l. 371, 421 
(discussing a case in which the SEC alleged-and Freeman assumed as true for purposes of 
argument-that "the lawyers knew or should have known that [the company whose financial 
statements were being certified] intended to use the opinions to satisfy [the accountants] that the 
sale of [a subsidiary and the parent company's] gain therefrom could be accounted for in [the parent 
company's] financial statements for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1969," even though 
negotiations for that sale had not even commenced when the opinions were given, and the opinions 
failed to disclose that negotiations had not commenced). That case is superficially similar to this 
Article's scenario in that "it is not the issuance of the [legal] opinions per se that [is] illegal" but, 
rather, the accounting purpose for which the opinions are ultimately used. Id. at 424. However, that 
case is fundamentally different because this Article's scenario assumes that the lawyers neither 
know nor should know that their opinions will be used to facilitate an accounting fraud (although 
they know, or should know, that their opinions will be used to facilitate off-balance-sheet 
accounting, presumably in accordance with GAAP). 
27. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 137. 
28. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 4:1, at 4-5 (observing that the "cases [on true sale] are 
not easily harmonized, and different readers can argue as to which factors are relevant and which 
are entitled to the greater weight"); TriBar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptc-y 
Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 717, 
721 (1991) (stating that these opinions are normally provided in "reasoned" form, signifying 
inherent "uncertainties and limitations to the recipient"). A typical reasoned structured-finance 
opinion resembles, in the author's experience, a mini-treatise, comprising 40-60 single-spaced 
pages. 
29. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1551-74 (arguing that securitization, the dominant form of 
structured-finance transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable); see also Schwarcz, 
Enron, supra note 10, at 1314-18 (distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses ofSPVs 
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Nor is there any proof that lawyers, in rendering these opinions, have mens rea 
or the intent to mislead the public.30 Even though, as mentioned, off-balance-
sheet financing may sometimes mask liabilities that only first become evident 
to some investors when a company goes bankrupt (and thus those investors in 
fact may be misled),31 diligent investors would have learned of those liabilities 
by reading the footnotes to the company's fmancial statements.32 
Why, then, are lawyers being accused of wrongdoing merely for issuing 
these opinions?33 And, in that context, what duties should a lawyer owe the 
public in rendering the opinions? These questions go to the essence of what it 
means for lawyers to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities 
(hereinafter simply "externalities,,)34 such as by potentially misleading readers 
of financial statements issued by companies acting as originators and thus 
ultimately misleading investors in those companies' securities.35 If lawyers 
issuing legal opinions owe a duty to the public as well as to the opinion 
recipient, is that duty the same, for example, as the duty an internal 
government lawyer owes the public when writing a legal opinion that advises 
and arguing that even transactions designed solely to achieve accounting results should not be 
presumptively unlawful). 
30. But cf In re Emon Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 704-05 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (refusing to dismiss claims against a law firm when the complaint alleged, among 
other things, that the law firm issued true sale opinions necessary to effectuate the client's allegedly 
fraudulent plan). 
31. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
33. These accusations arise, I will show, because structured-finance transactions can have 
potential information failures. I argue, however, that these failures are primarily the fault of 
investors, and at most they are exacerbated by the dual-information problem-that legal-opinion 
information is accurately provided for one purpose, .bankruptcy, but then used out of context for 
another purpose, accounting. Also, to some extent these accusations reflect the reality that when 
companies fail, lawyers are often the deepest pockets. And, because the criteria for a bankruptcy 
sale are not at all clear-cut, the existence of contingent recourse in the underlying transaction may 
prompt injured parties and regulators to assert that structured-finance opinions are wrong. To avoid 
the costs and vagaries of litigation, such cases are usually settled even where the opinions are 
accurate. These accusations can also result from the imposition of retroactive laws. 
34. The infringement of rights of noncontracting parties is referred to as an "externality." See, 
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1972). The economic definition of 
externality is "the indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production activity on the 
consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production function of a 
producer." 2 THE NEW PALGRA VE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 263, 263-65 (John Eatwell et al. 
eds., 1987). Legal commentators, however, usually define externalities as harm (or costs) to third 
parties. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1416, 1436-41 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual 
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2325-26 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and 
Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1817, 1818-19 (1993). Third parties theoretically may 
even include the public at large. 
35. I emphasize the potential for misleading investors in the originator's securities because, in 
a typical structured-finance transaction, only those investors-and not the SPV's investors-
potentially would be misled. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
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on the legality of interrogation policies for enemy detainees?36 And, in a 
broader sense, exactly what type of "speech" is a legal opinion? Remarkably, 
these are virtually issues of first impression. 
These questions also force a rethinking of the ambiguous line between 
disclosure required by securities law and the accounting disclosure imple-
mented through issuance of certified financial statements. Although the latter 
originated as a financial-information subset of securities law disclosure, 
explicitly delegated to the accounting profession by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,37 the boundary of that subset has blurred in recent 
years.38 As a result, and as the legal opinion controversy illustrates, there is 
uncertainty about the proper divide between the role of the lawyer and the role 
of the accountant in disclosing information to investors. 
On a more practical level, the answers to these questions will dictate the 
very viability of the entire structured-finance industry. The economic conse-
quences are enormous: securitization, for example, "one of the dominant 
means of capital formation in the United States,,39 and one that is rapidly ex-
panding worldwide,40 has over six trillion dollars of financing outstanding in 
the United States alone.41 
This Article first discusses the nature of legal opinions. It then examines 
and assesses the criticisms of structured-finance opinions in the context of the 
historical debate over whether and to what extent lawyers have a responsibility 
to the public in addition to their responsibility to clients. The Article next 
analyzes, from a normative standpoint, what constraints should bind 
structured-finance opinions and the lawyers who provide them. Because the 
analysis is normative, its critique of legal opinion practice in the United States 
may help inform the practice abroad. Finally, the Article examines the extent 
36. I refer, of course, to the now infamous August I, 2002 memorandum from Assistant 
Attorney General Jay Bybee, prepared with the assistance of Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
John c. Yoo and others in the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. 
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, advising on interrogation methods that supposedly would not 
violate prohibitions against torture. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, 
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,2002) (on file with author). 
37. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 319, 320, 346--47 (2002) 
(discussing the SEC's delegation of disclosure power to the accounting profession through the 
profession's privately organized Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which resulted in 
GAAP). 
38. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial-Information Failure: Rethinking the Boundary Between 
Lawyer and Accountant Liability 5--6 (Sept. 20, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(observing that "the increasing complexity of financial transactions has blurred the boundaries 
between [the accountant's and the lawyer's] disclosure duties"). 
39. Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'If 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection with the SEC's issuance of 
Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
40. SCHWARCZ, supra note 8, § 8: I, at 8-3. 
41. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 1655, 1656 (2004) (referring to 2003 domestic financial statistics showing that "[a]s of the end 
of 2002, there were more than 6 trillion dollars of outstanding securities issued in securitizations"). 
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to which the analysis sheds light on the more general problem of business 
lawyers issuing legal opinions that create externalities. 
I. The Nature of Legal Opinions 
Legal opinions are merely informed judgments, usually in writing, given 
by lawyers on issues oflaw.42 Although legal opinions are sometimes directed 
to clients, in a transactional setting legal opinions are often provided, at the 
request of clients, to or for the benefit of third parties43 such as financiers of 
credit or investors.44 Because the transactions requiring third-party legal 
opinions span the entire range of business and financial undertakings,45 such 
opinions have become far more prevalent than opinions directed to clients.46 
In fact, the vast majority of legal opinions in structured-finance transactions, 
including virtually all true sale and nonconsolidation opinions, are third-party 
legal opinions,47 typically provided to or for the benefit of the SPY's investors 
by outside counsel to the originator.48 Requiring outside counsel to provide 
42. Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions et aI., Legal Opinions to 
Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891, 1896 (1979) [hereinafter Easier Path] (stating 
that a legal "opinion is not a guaranty, but merely a lawyer's informed judgment as to a specific 
question of law"). 
43. In the author's experience, legal opinions are occasionally formally addressed to clients but 
substantively intended to benefit (or, at least, also benefit) third parties who are explicitly permitted 
to rely thereon. This Article regards such opinions as "third-party" legal opinions. 
44. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, THIRD PARTY LEGAL OPINIONS: EVALUATION AND 
ANALYSIS 5-8 (1995) (discussing the purposes and uses of third-party legal opinions, and 
comparing such opinions to legal opinions issued to clients); see also Scon FITZGIBBON & 
DONALD W. GLAZER, FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.3.1, at 5 (1992) (noting 
that "the lender, acquiring company, or underwriter" makes use of closing opinions). For clarity, 
this Article will refer to parties-whether the client or third parties--explicitly authorized to rely on 
legal opinions as "opinion recipients," in contrast to other third parties or the public. 
45. Third-party legal opinions are typically required, for example, in secured and unsecured 
financings, mergers and acquisitions, securities offerings, real estate transactions, debt financings, 
securitizations, and purchase agreements. See FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.3.1, at 5. 
46. Cf id. § 1.1, at 3 (referring to third-party legal opinions as a "feature of the American 
legal scene"); Committee on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, Law Office Opinion 
Practices, 60 Bus. LAW. 327,327 (2004) (observing that "[e]very week hundreds, if not thousands, 
of third party legal opinions are delivered at closings for business transactions"); see also Bryn 
Vaaler, Bridging the Gap: Legal Opinions as an Introduction to Business Lawyering, 61 UMKC L. 
REv. 23, 27 (1992) (describing third-party legal opinions as "[t]he most prevalent type of written 
opinion rendered by business lawyers"). 
47. See generally STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S. 
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 173-74 (2004), available at http://www2.standardandpoors 
.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SF Jegal_criteria]INAL.pdf (discussing legal opinions required to rate 
various structured-finance transactions). 
48. Even true sale and nonconsolidation opinions that are formally addressed to the client but 
substantively intended to benefit the SPY's investors, who are explicitly permitted to rely thereon, 
are effectively third-party legal opinions. See supra note 43. 
10 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1 
these opinions helps assure the independence-and hence, the integrity-ofthe 
opinions.49 
Third parties commonly require these opinions as a condition precedent to 
closing business transactions. 50 The opinions provide some assurance that, at 
least insofar as those parties have requested opinion coverage (coverage of a 
third-party legal opinion, although theoretically a private matter to be 
negotiated among the parties to a transaction, is often dictated by customary 
expectations of the opinion's recipients5!), nothing legally problematic lurks 
beneath the transaction's surface.52 Lawyers providing the opinion apply 
49. In this context, it should be noted that investors are not misled due to agency problems, 
which arise when attorneys give opinions to nonclient third parties. Whereas if attorneys give 
opinions to their own clients, the incentives are more aligned and the attorneys are more likely to 
inform their clients of problems. Even if third-party opinion recipients hired their own counsel, 
however, there is no reason to believe they would receive more accurate or informative opinions. 
Indeed, any misleading of investors is unrelated to the relationship between attorneys issuing the 
opinions and third parties receiving such opinions. The latter are investors in the SPY's securities, 
whereas only investors in the originator's securities are potentially misled. See supra notes 12-18 
and accompanying text; see also Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 6 n.36 (distinguishing an originator's 
investors "from the very narrow and highly specialized class of sophisticated investors in securities 
issued by the SP[V]s that are parties to the originator's structured transactions"). 
50. Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57 
Bus. LAW. 875,875 (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines] ("The agreement for a business transaction will 
often condition a party's obligation to close on [a legal opinion's] receipt."). Cj Committee on 
Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the 
Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAW. 167, 169 (1991) [hereinafter 
Silverado Report] ("Custom and practice have developed over the years pursuant to which a legal 
opinion is delivered at the closing to parties to the transaction (e.g., an acquiror, lenders or 
investors) other than the opinion giver's client."); TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party 
"Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. LAW. 591, 596 (1998) [hereinafter TriBar 1998 Report] ("The 
relevant agreement in a business transaction will often provide for delivery of an opinion letter as a 
condition of closing."). 
51. See, e.g., Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1894 (observing that third-party legal opinions 
"have developed and evolved by a mixed pattern of custom, bargaining and need"); TriBar 1998 
Report, supra note 50, at 640 (observing that opinion recipients typically need certain information 
in the legal opinions and, therefore, such information has become customary in legal opinions). For 
example, a financier requesting a third-party legal opinion will want coverage at least as broad as 
that customarily expected by other financiers or investors to facilitate resale of the securities issued 
in the transaction to other fmanciers or investors. See, e.g., I EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. 
REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 4.02[3], at 4-15-
4-16 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that certain resales of securities are exempt from the Securities Act 
registration requirements "if accompanied by (i) a legal opinion that the transaction in question is 
exempt or (ii) an investment or nondistribution letter from the purchaser containing essentially the 
same representations and agreements as those provided by the original purchaser, or both"). 
Sometimes coverage is also dictated by regulatory law. See M. JOHN STERBA, JR., LEGAL OPINION 
LETTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE § 1.3, at 1-10 (3d ed. 2002) 
(discussing securities regulations that require the issuance of legal opinions); see also ARTHUR 
NORMAN FIELD, LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1:3, at 1-4 n.8 (2004) (citing a 
New York regulatory requirement that requires opinions in bank mergers and acquisitions). 
52. See FlTzGmBoN & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 1 (affirming that legal opinions assure 
the company that "the transaction works from a legal point of view" and that "as a legal matter the 
rights it is acquiring are those it has bargained for"); MACEY, supra note 44, at 6 (stating that a 
"third party opinion may also be requested on the presumption that it will warn the recipient of any 
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applicable law to the transaction's particular facts in order to reach their legal 
conclusions. 53 In this sense, third-party legal opinions operate to effectively 
reduce information asymmetry between parties to a transaction. 54 
Correspondingly, the inability of counsel to deliver a requested opinion at 
closing signals a problem and allows intended opinion recipients to refuse to 
consummate the transaction.55 
. However, neither third-party legal opinions nor legal opinions addressed 
to clients purport to evaluate a transaction's inherent business wisdom.56 At 
least heretofore, an opining lawyer has had no duty to evaluate the business 
merits of the underlying transaction beyond the obvious ethical and legal 
obligations of not knowingly furthering a fraudulent transaction.57 
potential problems which may arise from the transaction"); see also FIELD, supra note 51, § 1:5, at 
1-5-1-6 (describing the role of legal opinions in providing some assurance to their recipients that 
"property delivered at a closing ... has the desired legal characteristics and that the various 
provisions ofa complex agreement, which purport to give a set of rights to each party, will be given 
effect by the courts"). 
53. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 608. Thus, third-party legal opinions are not 
typically requested on legal issues whose analysis would be independent of the transaction's fact 
pattern. See Kaye Scholer Update 04-05 #2, at 1 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (observing that legal opinions are only required on legal issues whose underlying facts are 
transaction specific). 
54. See Vaaler, supra note 46, at 38 (discussing Professor Ronald Gilson's theory of 
"transaction cost engineering" as it relates to the role of third-party legal opinions in diminishing 
information asymmetry between transacting parties). I say that third-party legal opinions 
"effectively" reduce information asymmetry because, technically, recipients of such opinions often 
have the same factual information as opining counsel. However, opining counsel assesses certain 
legal consequences of that information for the opinion recipients. 
55. Third-party legal opinions can also decrease risks to the recipient by arguably hindering the 
nonrecipient party's ability to "attack[) the validity of the transaction" after closing. Koley Jessen, 
P.C. Legal Opinion Committee, Third-Party Legal Opinions: An Introduction to "Customary 
Practice", 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 153, 155-56 (2001) [hereinafter Customary Practice] (quoting 
George W. Bermant, Third party Legal Opinions, C533 ALI-ABA 1337, 1348-50 (1990)). But cf 
SCOTT FITZGIBBON ET AL., FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.3.2, at 11 (2d ed., 
Aspen Law & Bus. 2001) (stating that even though it has been suggested that a third-party opinion 
letter "may foreclose, or at least make it awkward for the company to assert, certain defenses ... in 
the event of a dispute," it is unlikely that a legal opinion will "dissuade [ a] company from asserting 
whatever defenses may be available to it or prevent a court from reaching its own legal 
conclusions"). Nevertheless, third-party legal opinions are an accepted (and sometimes almost 
mandatory) means of establishing due diligence on the part of a recipient corporation's directors. 
Cf Customary Practice, supra at 156 (quoting Bermant that "[a]nother stated purpose is to satisfy 
the recipient that the lawyer has done due diligence and assured himlherselfthat all is right with the 
client"); see also FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 1.3.2, at 8 (noting that "receipt of an 
opinion letter may help directors and officers establish that they have exercised care and acted in 
good faith if a transaction later turns out badly"); id. § 1.3.1, at 6-7 (stating that third-party legal 
opinions are "one of the building blocks in the opinion recipient's due diligence investigation"); 
Guidelines, supra note 50, at 875 ("[T]he closing opinion serves as a part of the recipient's 
diligence. "). 
56. See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 727-28 (stating that "bankruptcy law 
opinions, like other opinions to third parties, only express views on specific issues oflaw and do not 
impose an obligation of providing general advice to the recipient"). 
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. c (2000) ("A lawyer 
may not do or assist an unlawful act on behalf of a client .... "); Guidelines, supra note 50, at 876 
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Surprisingly, although third-party legal opinions are now almost 
universally required in large business and financial transactions,58 their 
widespread use is relatively recent.59 The relevant scholarly literature is thus 
sparse,60 and the scholarship concerning lawyer conduct within the adversary 
legal system is largely inapplicable.61 In past decades, however, bar associa-
tions and practitioners have tried to establish third-party legal opinion 
guidelines and best practices.62 Because the central role of these opinions is to 
reduce information asymmetry, it is generally agreed that the goal of opinion 
("An opinion giver should not render an opinion that the opinion giver recognizes will mislead the 
recipient .... "); TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 728 n.34 (clarifying that "a lawyer 
cannot, in any circwnstance, knowingly make a false statement of law or fact or knowingly assist a 
client in committing a fraud"); TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 602 (reinforcing the principle 
that a lawyer may not mislead the opinion recipient). 
58. See FIELD, supra note 51, § 1:3, at 1-3 (stating that "in most significant transactions, 
lawyers routinely propose the opinions to be given in their early drafts of docwnentation," and that 
although "[t]he details of these opinions are often modified in the negotiations ... the requirement 
for an opinion, once asserted, is seldom deleted altogether"). 
59. See Customary Practice, supra note 55, at 155 (observing that third-party legal opinions 
came into existence "only in the last forty years or so"). But cf FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra 
note 44, § 1.1, at 2 n.5 (noting the use of third-party legal opinions at least as early as the 
1930s). 
60. The following articles, some more scholarly than others, touch on third-party legal 
opinions: Thomas L. Ambro & J. Truman Bidwell, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Economics of Legal 
Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 307, 307 ("This article will examine the ways in which a 
third party legal opinion may, or may not, give value to the recipient and suggest that the necessity 
for and scope of an Opinion should be measured in part on the basis of a costlbenefit analysis."); 
Donald W. Glazer & Charles R.B. Macedo, Determining the Underlying Facts: An Epistemological 
Look at Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 343, 343 ("This 
article discusses a subject that has received very little attention in the literature-how lawyers deal 
with facts in legal opinion letters."); Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in 
Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 283, 283 ("This article focuses upon the 
attorney's duties and liabilities as the giver of a legal opinion, and it explores the tension between 
his or her role as advocate, negotiator, and implementer on the one hand, and as opinion giver on 
the other."); Customary Practice, supra note 55 (providing historical background); John C. Quale & 
Brian D. Weimer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions Affected by FCC Regulation: An 
Economic Approach, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 773, 775 (1999) ("In carrying out this analysis, the 
Article argues that legal opinions add value to corporate transactions only when a lawyer is the 
least-cost provider of the information sought."). Professor Macey also has written a book on third-
party legal opinions, but it is primarily descriptive. See generally MACEY, supra note 44. Professor 
Lipson is in the process of writing a comprehensive scholarly article exploring third-party legal 
opinion practice. Jonathan C. Lipson, Price and Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice 
Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation) (Feb. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
61. See infra text accompanying notes 130-43, 317-18. 
62. The seminal works are Guidelines, supra note 50; Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal 
Opinion Principles, 53 Bus. LAW. 831 (1998) [hereinafter Legal Opinion Principles]; Silverado 
Report, supra note 50; James J. Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to 
Bring Some Order out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915 (1973); Easier Path, supra note 42; 
TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50. There are also a multitude of practitioner-oriented sources. 
E.g., FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44. 
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givers is to accurately and fairly present legal conclusions based on the 
transaction's particular facts. 63 
Sometimes, though, third parties request opinions on issues where the law 
is undeveloped, unsettled, or otherwise not subject to black-letter certainty. 
Many issues arising from an originator's bankruptcy, for example, present such 
a degree of uncertainty.64 Nonetheless, assuming they have sufficient 
expertise, lawyers traditionally will attempt to issue a requested opinion where 
there is enough precedent or other authority to enable a degree of ex ante 
prediction.65 
In those cases, lawyers normally issue "reasoned" opinions.66 These are 
legal opinions that, rather than setting forth black-letter legal conclusions, 
engage in a substantive discussion of the applicable law and qualify that 
discussion as appropriate with reasonable assumptions, cautionary language, 
and disclosure ofuncertainties.67 If opinion recipients wish to proceed with the 
transaction despite these cautions and uncertainties, they do so forewarned and 
at their own risk.68 All structured-finance opinions are reasoned opinions, 
63. See generally FIELD, supra note 51, §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-2 (describing the opining lawyer as 
"akin to ... a judge preparing a decision in a case, rather than that of an advocate for the client"); 
see generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-1 (stating that "the opinion given must be fair and objective"); see 
generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-3--4-7 (detailing the process of the opining lawyer acting as a 
"hypothetical contemporaneous court" in applying the law within the factual framework of a 
particular transaction); see generally id. §§ 4.1--4.6, at 4-1 (stating that "the opinion given must be 
fair and objective"); see a/so FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 3.3, at 55 ("Because the 
analysis included in a reasoned opinion is intended to inform, it should be fair, balanced, and 
objective. As the ABA Guidelines correctly point out, reasoned opinions should not be 'an exercise 
in advocacy."'); see a/so DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS 23 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005) ("Opinion givers and counsel for opinion recipients should be 
guided by a sense of professionalism and not treat opinions simply as if they were terms in a 
business negotiation."); see a/so Guidelines, supra note 50, at 878 (outlining the "Golden Rule" in 
closing opinions: all requests and disclosures should abide by a general notion of fairness and 
professionalism). 
64. See supra note 28. 
65. FIELD,supranote 51, § 2:4, at 2-5. 
66. TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 734; see a/so FIELD, supra note 51, § 2:4, at 
2-5 (discussing the use of reasoned opinions where unqualified opinions would improperly gloss 
over the unsettled nature of a legal issue); STERBA, supra note 51, § 1.4, at 1-12 (stating that a 
reasoned opinion "may be advisable either because the law itself is unclear, the facts are not entirely 
straightforward, or the lawyer believes there are reasonable arguments that might lead to a different 
legal interpretation than the one the opining lawyer favors"); Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1895 
(observing that "it is inappropriate to seek to require an unqualified opinion on an uncertain or 
disputed legal principle"). Cj FITZGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 3.3, at 55 (noting that even 
when they may be confident in a certain outcome, attorneys may "choose to spell out [their] 
reasoning to alert the opinion recipient to the contrary authority and to provide it the opportunity to 
solicit the views of its own counsel"). 
67. See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 28, at 721 (noting that "[t]he use of a reasoned 
opinion is one method by which opining counsel communicates uncertainties and limitations to the 
recipient, even if opining counsel is able to reach an unqualified conclusion''). 
68. Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1895-96 (stating that "[i]f the opinion is qualified or 
uncertain, the addressee is on notice of certain elements of limitation and should then satisfy itself 
as to the risks of proceeding with the transaction in view of those limitations"); TriBar Opinion 
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typically ranging twenty to fifty pages in length,69 and they function to reduce 
infonnation asymmetry between the parties to the structured-finance 
transaction regarding bankruptcy remoteness-the primary issue of concern to 
the SPV's investors.7o 
Having discussed the nature of legal opinions, including structured-
finance opinions, I next examine the criticisms of those opinions in historical 
context. References below to structured-fmance opinions mean reasoned, 
third-party, structured-finance opinions. 71 
II. Assessing the Criticisms of Structured-Finance Opinions 
Commentators have advanced, essentially, three criticisms of structured-
finance opinions: (i) wherever there are sufficient warning signs, a lawyer 
should go beyond the technical tenns of the opinion and affinnatively 
investigate the transaction for fraud; 72 (ii) a lawyer should have an obligation 
to advise his client, and perhaps other opinion recipients, as to whether the 
entire transaction is legal or not;73 and (iii) irrespective of whether a legal 
opinion is technically correct, it is misleading if it does not fairly present the 
situation.74 To assess these criticisms, one must first understand the historical 
debate over whether and to what extent lawyers have a responsibility to the 
public-especially when issuing legal opinions-in addition to their 
responsibility to clients or the opinion recipient. The criticism of structured-
finance opinions is ultimately intertwined with that debate. 
A. The Historical Debate Over a Lawyer's Public Responsibility 
"[A]t common law, an attorney has been traditionally viewed as owing a 
duty only to the specific client for whom he perfonned his professional 
service.,,75 Nonetheless, it often has been observed that attorneys function as 
officers of the court in addition to their role as advocates for and counselors to 
Committee, supra note 28, at 738 ("A reasoned opinion is sufficient to put the opinion recipient on 
notice as to the uncertainties and limitations ... inherent in opining on those bankruptcy law matters 
covered in the opinion."). 
69. This estimate is based on the author's experience. 
70. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 135-36 (explaining the two elements of 
bankruptcy remoteness-a true sale for bankruptcy purposes of receivables from the originator to 
the SPY, and protection of the Spy from the originator's bankruptcy-and observing that investors 
in the SpY's securities require bankruptcy remoteness). Structured-finance opinions address these 
precise two elements: whether there is a bankruptcy true sale, and whether the SPY could be 
substantively consolidated with the originator's estate in bankruptcy. See supra notes 21, 23. 
71. This reflects that virtually all structured-fmance opinions are third-party reasoned legal 
opinions. See supra notes 47-49, 69 and accompanying text. 
72. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
74. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. 
75. Marshall L. Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: 
Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1973). 
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their clients.76 That capacity might appear to imbue attorneys with some 
measure of public responsibility. 
During the formative years of common law development, however, there 
was little if any real conflict between an attorney's responsibility to a client and 
to the public.77 Therefore, there was little need to try to define that latter 
responsibility. The need to balance client and public responsibilities became 
more acute, though, after passage of the federal securities laws.78 These laws 
governed, among other things, the lawyer's role in preparing disclosure to 
investors of the risks associated with securities offerings.79 
As a result, shortly after these laws were enacted, one leading 
commentator predicted "a restatement of [the attorney's] answerability to the 
court and to society, and a reminder that he is not an ordinary employee of his 
client.,,80 Before becoming Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Harlan 
Stone once similarly commented on the need to examine a lawyer's public 
responsibility, lamenting that the increased demand of business and finance for 
76. See. e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2002) ("A lawyer, as a member of 
the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice."). 
77. See, e.g., Small, supra note 75, at 1189 (observing that from the early 1930s until the 1970s 
"there has been little occasion ... for the courts to consider the ... suggestion" that "the Securities 
Act of 1933 may serve to broaden the responsibility and liability of lawyers to the investing 
public"). 
78. These laws, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78111 (2005), primarily consist of the Securities 
Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2005), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005). For an argument that lawyers were viewed, even prior 
to enactment of these laws, as having public responsibility as well as a duty to the client, see Robert 
W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 
1185, 1207--08 (2003) ("No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil 
or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should any lawyer render, any service or 
advice involving ... deception or betrayal of the public." (citing CODE OF PROF'L ETHICS CANON 
32 (1908)). Professor Gordon also observes that "[i]n the post World War II era, a group oflawyers 
and legal academics ... theorized ... the role of the new corporate legal counselor as a 'statesman-
advisor,'" seeking the client's "long-range social benefit." Id. at 1208. That role, however, does 
not necessarily appear to impose a public responsibility on the lawyer; instead, it might well reflect 
the longstanding corporate law debate over whether directors should manage for immediate or long-
term profits. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (discussing that 
debate). In any event, Gordon notes that since the 1970s, this role "has been in decay," and now 
"has almost no institutional support in the rules and disciplinary bodies that regulate the [legal] 
profession." Gordon, supra, at 1209. 
79. For example, a legal opinion provided to an underwriter in connection with an offering of 
securities may support the "due diligence" defense available under the Securities Act of 1933. 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2005). Likewise, Regulation S-K, an administrative interpretation of the 
Securities Act, requires as an exhibit to the registration statement "[a]n opinion of counsel as to the 
legality of the securities being registered, indicating whether they will, when sold, be legally issued, 
fully paid and non-assessable, and, if debt securities, whether they will be binding obligations of the 
registrant." 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (b)(5) (2005). See also Lipson, supra note 60, at 22 (observing that 
"[a]lthough current banking regulations appear not to require closing opinions explicitly, lawyers 
express a vague belief that opinion practice might have grown in response to some of the 
requirements of the Banking ... Act of 1933"). 
80. Nathan Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CAL. L. REv. 39, 47 (1935). 
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the best lawyers "[a]t its worst ... has made the learned profession of an earlier 
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and 
manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.,,81 Even 
those who disagreed with this view admitted that business pressures were 
blurring the line between a lawyer's duty to his client and his duty to the 
public.82 
Nonetheless, only decades later did anyone begin. to systematically 
examine a lawyer's public responsibility by attempting to answer the narrow 
question: "[T]o whom are the securities lawyer's duties owed?,,83 As that 
question suggests, the debate over a lawyer's responsibility to the public has, at 
least to date, been largely limited to the responsibility of securities lawyers. 84 
And, even in that limited context, much of the recent debate has focused on the 
technical issue of securities-lawyer exposure to aiding-and-abetting liability, 
rather than on normative responsibility.85 
81. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1934). 
82. See, e.g., Robert T. Swaine, Big Impact of Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics 
of the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A. J. 89, 171 (1949) (rejecting the charge that lawyers have become 
servants of corporate clients but admitting that loyalty to these clients threatens lawyers' 
independence); see also Freeman, supra note 26, at 373-74 (explaining the disagreement between 
early commentators, such as Stone and Swaine, over whether lawyers were sacrificing their 
integrity to serve corporate clients). 
83. Small, supra note 75, at 1191; see also Freeman, supra note 26 at 374-76 (similarly 
beginning to systemically examine a lawyer's public responsibility). 
84. Small, for example, focuses on a lawyer's responsibilities only when rendering explicit 
securities-law legal opinions or when "acqui[ring] and disseminati[ng] ... information in the 
securities field." Small, supra note 75, at 1207. Moreover, the debate over a lawyer's public 
responsibility appears to be even more narrowly focused on privity of contract and the question of 
whether attorneys who otherwise violate securities law should be held liable to investors who are 
not their clients. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The 
Third-Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1309 (1991). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agendafor the SEC, 
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1310-16 (2003) (advocating a "gatekeeper" function for securities 
lawyers so as to diminish the harm of defective disclosures to the investing public). 
85. That debate concerns whether lawyers who participate in securities fraud can be held liable, 
as aiders and abettors, in private causes of action under § 1 O(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005)) or Rule IOb-5 thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2005)). In 
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Supreme Court held that 
only primary actors, not aiders and abettors, could be held so liable. 511 U.S. 164, 175, 180 (1994). 
Therefore, only if lawyers acted as primary violators of Rule IOb-5, such as by employing a 
manipulative device or making a material misstatement or omission in connection with the sale of 
securities, could they be held liable in a private cause of action. Id. at 191. Subsequent to the 
Central Bank decision, lower courts have developed two divergent theories as to when primary 
liability could attach to a secondary actor, such as a lawyer, for merely participating in the conduct 
proscribed under § 1O(b). Under the first "bright-line" theory, the secondary actor must make a 
material misrepresentation or omission that is attributed to that actor at the time of public 
dissemination to be liable as a primary violator. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 
169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that "the misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor 
at the time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision"); Aegis J. 
Frumento, Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors in the Sale of Securities: Does In re Enron 
Square with Central Bank?, 59 Bus. LAW. 975, 980-81 (2004) (discussing the emergence of lower 
courts' theories as to when primary liability could be imposed on secondary actors under § 10(b) 
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In contrast, recent events, including the Enron and W orldCom debacles, 
have not only made the debate over a lawyer's public responsibilities more 
urgent, but, significantly, have also expanded the debate's scope beyond that of 
securities law or securities lawyers per se.86 Lawyers issuing structured-
finance opinions, or other opinions associated with off-balance-sheet 
financing, are neither acting as securities lawyers nor expressing opinions on 
securities law.87 They are, nevertheless, opining on matters that may impact, 
albeit indirectly, disclosure to investors of corporate information. Should these 
lawyers be responsible to the public for the ultimate use that is made of their 
opinions, even if their opinions are neither incorrect nor misleading on their 
jace?88 This Article focuses on that larger debate. 
Having provided this historical context, I next attempt to assess the three 
essential criticisms of structured-finance opinions. 
after the Central Bank opinion). Under the second "substantial participation" theory, the secondary 
actor need only have substantially participated or been intricately involved in the preparation of 
fraudulent statements even if the secondary actor did not actually make the statements. Howard v. 
Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that the Ninth Circuit has 
"held that substantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent 
statements is grounds for primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the 
actor's actual making of the statements" (citing In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 
615,628-29,629 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994))). Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 421-24 (arguing that issuing 
a legal opinion to be used to achieve misleading accounting treatment is "the essence of actionable 
aiding and abetting under the securities laws"). The substantial participation test has been widely 
criticized, though, as being inconsistent with the holding of Central Bank. See, e.g., Frumento, 
supra, at 995-1001. Recently, the court in In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
adopted a third "creation" theory, suggested by the SEC, under which a secondary actor who creates 
a misrepresentation, whether acting alone or with others and irrespective of whether his identity is 
disclosed to investors, can be liable as a primary violator under § 10(b), provided that he acts with 
the requisite scienter. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 586-89 (S.D. Tex. 2002). This theory has also been 
criticized as being inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank. Frumento, 
supra, at 996. There is no question, though, that a secondary actor who aids and abets securities 
fraud under § 10(b), whether subject to a private cause of action or not, could be liable under 18 
U.S.c. § 2, which imposes the principal actor's criminal liability on aiders and abettors. See 15 
U.S.c. § 77t(e) (2000); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 190. 
86. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 78, at 1210 (noting that "events like the Enron collapse make 
one realize that the corporate counselor would still have a useful role to play, if one could revive it 
as one of the legal profession's many roles, to be deployed on occasions where clients and society 
would be best served by independent, public-regarding legal advice"). 
87. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that structured-finance opinions address 
only bankruptcy law issues). 
88. There is no implication here that these lawyers should have some duty to advise on 
securities law; separate securities law counsel are virtually always engaged for transactions 
involving the issuance of securities. Cf LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES 
LAWS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2005) ("Although there may be areas oflaw a bright lawyer easily can learn on 
his or her own from the statutes, rules, and cases, federal securities law is not one of them. Give an 
eager and talented, but uninitiated, lawyer the Securities Act of 1933 and its rules and cases, provide 
a few weeks of cloistered study, and the lawyer is likely to emerge encyclopedic but confused."). 
To the extent necessary, however, securities lawyers preparing the disclosure ought to consult 
structured-finance counsel--even if such counsel are at different firms-to ensure they're 
accurately disclosing the structured-finance transaction. 
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B. Assessing the Criticisms o/Structured-Finance Opinions 
1. The First Criticism.-Commentators argue that wherever there are 
sufficient "red flags," or warning signs, a lawyer should go beyond the 
technical terms of the opinion and affirmatively investigate the transaction for 
fraud. 89 Lawyers should not be able to say, for example, that they did not 
understand why certain unusual documents are used in a transaction. One 
commentator thus argues that if counsel in Dynegy's "Project Alpha" trans-
action had investigated why the parties entered into highly unusual "tear-up" 
documents, they would have found that Project Alpha was structured to 
achieve inappropriate off-balance-sheet treatment for what was effectively a 
lending transaction.90 
I agree in concept that where there are sufficient warning signs, a lawyer 
should--out of concern for integrity and reputation, not to mention the need to 
understand the relevant aspects of a transaction on which the lawyer is 
opining-affirmatively investigate for fraud. 91 The trick, though, is identifying 
what constitutes warning signs: some "red flags" may be (metaphorically) 
furled and hard to see, whereas "orange flags" sometimes might appear red. 
As an example of the latter, the commentator mentioned above naively alleges 
that where an SPV is used as a "fmancing vehicle," a true sale legal opinion is 
necessarily misleading because the transaction must be regarded as a loan.92 
This commentator fails to recognize that virtually all structured-fmance 
transactions have loan-like economics,93 a fact irrelevant to a true sale 
determination.94 
2. The Second Criticism.-Others assert that a lawyer should have an 
obligation to advise the client, and perhaps other opinion recipients, about the 
89. See Koppel, supra note 1, at 164 (attributing this argument to Deborah Rhode, a professor 
of law at Stanford University Law School); see also Gordon, supra note 78, at 1193, 1201 (arguing 
that lawyers may need to inquire beyond their limited role where they suspect problems). 
90. Koppel, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
91. This does not mean, however, that the lawyer should investigate for fraud in the sense that a 
district attorney would investigate. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (arguing that 
opining counsel need only investigate sufficiently to see if the warning sign can be dispelled and the 
requested opinion given). 
92. Koppel, supra note 1, at 165 (arguing that in a recent case, "[i]n light of their roles as 
draftsmen of [the SPY], shouldn't the lawyers have known that [it] was a fInancing vehicle [and] 
shouldn't they have complained when it became clear that [it] would not [be] treat[ed] ... as 
such?"). 
93. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension Between 
Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAW. 109, lIS (2004) (arguing that "in form, securitization 
transactions are contractually arranged sales of fmancial assets" but "[i]n economic substance, 
however, they are not dissimilar to transfers intended as security (i.e., loans secured by the fInancial 
assets)"). 
94. Id. at 109 (explaining why loan-like economics is not, and should not be, a basis for 
recharacterizing a "sale" structure as a loan). 
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legality of the transactions being opined on.95 Thus, the lawyer should ask, 
irrespective of how an accountant would view a transaction, "Is this 
[transaction] fraudulent or designed to mislead investors?,,96 
This stance is especially problematic where outside counsel are asked to 
opine only on certain aspects of a transaction. Examining the entire transaction 
then would be costly. It is questionable whether this cost is justified, especially 
since companies generally have no obligation to retain counsel when engaging 
in business transactions. If this cost is not justified, counsel should only be 
obligated to assess the legality of the relevant portions of transactions on which 
they are opining97-recognizing, of course, that if counsel spot warning signs 
in the course of that assessment, they should investigate further to the extent 
discussed above.98 
3. The Third Criticism.-Finally, some commentators argue that a 
structured-finance opinion is misleading, irrespective of whether it is 
technically correct,99 if it does not fairly present the situation. lOo This criticism 
has several fallacies. Exactly which scenario, for example, should an opinion 
be fairly presenting where counsel opines only on certain aspects of a 
transaction? To avoid unnecessary costs associated with examining the entire 
transaction, it would appear that opinion givers should strive for fair 
presentation only of the legal conclusions derived from the transaction's 
95. Koppel, supra note I, at 168 (attributing this argument to George Cohen, an ethics professor 
at University of Virginia School of Law). 
96. Id.; Appendix C (Role of Enron's Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-
Appointed Examiner at \2, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing 
the duties of Rex Rogers, the Enron in-house attorney primarily responsible for securities 
disclosure, and concluding that "a fact-finder could determine that Rogers committed malpractice 
based on negligence for his failure to inform himself about the [SPY] transactions so that he could 
properly advise Enron with respect to the disclosure issues raised by these transactions"). 
97. Counsel need to understand the relevant portions of a transaction on which they are opining 
because their opinion, which applies law to facts, is based on that understanding. See supra note 91 
and accompanying text. An obvious corollary is that counsel's understanding must have a 
reasonable basis. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 906 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (observing that "[w]here a defendant [in that case, a law firm] makes false 
statements, honestly believing them to be true, but without reasonable grounds for such belief, he 
may be held liable for negligent misrepresentation, a form of deceit"). 
98. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
99. This case should be distinguished from the situation where a professional's technical due 
diligence is insufficient because, in light of the professional's special knowledge and continuity of 
conduct, the professional should have known the advice is misleading. See, e.g., Bentel v. United 
States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1926) (observing that "there are many cases where from the 
actor's special situation and continuity of conduct an inference that he did know the untruth of what 
he said or wrote may ... be drawn"); see also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 861"'{)2 (2d 
Cir. 1964) (applying this principle to find that "[a]ny accountant must know that his obligations in 
certifying 'pro forma' [financial] statements are not satisfied by any such arithmetical exercise as 
[the accountant therein charged] performed"). My Article, however, assumes there is no mens rea. 
See text accompanying supra note 30. 
100. Koppel, supra note 1, at 166, 168. 
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particular facts-e.g., whether there has been a true sale and whether 
substantive consolidation is likely.lol 
More significantly, the criteria for fair presentation of a company's 
financial condition and results of operations are already dictated by generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). GAAP comprises a set of standards 
for financial accounting and reporting, officially recognized as authoritative by 
the SEC,102 that provide the "credib[ility], transparen[ cy], and comparab[ility]" 
needed for "the efficient functioning of the economy.,,103 Because it is highly 
technical and voluminous,104 knowledge about, much less expertise in, GAAP 
is well beyond the learning of most attorneys.105 Requiring attorneys to 
10 J. Cf supra note 63 (observing that because the central role of third-party legal opinions is 
reducing information asymmetry, it is generally agreed that the goal of opinion givers is accuracy 
and fair presentation oflegal conclusions derived from the transaction's particular facts). 
102. See supra note 37; see also WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 131 (2003) ("In the United States, generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(F ASB), a self-regulatory body authorized by the Securities Exchange Commission to establish 
accounting standards."); FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Facts About FASB I 
(2003-2004), available at http://www.fasb.org. 
103. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 102, at I. 
104. Sofia Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires after Kumho: The Bottom Line on 
Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 Hous. L. REv. 431, 486--87 (2000) ("A consideration of 
the body of authority, guidance, and literature on accounting standards ... makes clear that, by any 
objective standard, understanding accounting issues involves technical and specialized 
knowledge. "). 
105. See, e.g., David F. Birke, The Toothless Watchdog: Corporate Fraud and the Independent 
Audit-How Can the Public's Confidence Be Restored?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 891,904 (2004) ("As 
any former or practicing auditor can attest, GAAP can create a labyrinth of complex rules that only 
an experienced auditor could hope to understand."). This does not impugn Professor Cunningham's 
fundamental observation, with which I agree, that "[i]f business lawyers invariably confront 
questions of law and accounting in their practice, and it is difficult to understand core concepts and 
key cases in corporate law without a firm footing in accounting, it is incumbent upon the legal 
professorate to assure it provides adequate teaching." Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing 
Accounting's Burdens: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 BuS. LAW. 1421, 1449 
(2002). There is, however, a vast gap between understanding core concepts and applying technical 
accounting rules. Cunningham may be conflating the two by calling for business lawyers to "make 
it a professional habit to stay abreast of the top handful of hot topics of debate within the accounting 
profession and also understand the accounting aspects of transactions they are involved with (e.g., 
true sale rules, leasing rules, and derivatives rules)." Id at 1456. Lawyers should not, however, be 
obligated to apply technical accounting rules. See, for example, William O. Fischer, Where Were 
the Counselors? Reflections on Advice Not Given and the Role of Attorneys in the Accounting 
Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. REv. 29, 103 n.I75 (2003), arguing: 
Some [meaning Cunningham] suggest that lawyers should now become more active in 
client accounting and some advocate expanded accounting education for 
lawyers. . .. This essay argues for caution. While lawyers should develop enough 
knowledge to spot some accounting issues, it is unrealistic to suppose that attorneys 
will serve as extra, consulting accountants. That would require too much training and 
it would require lawyers to keep up with accounting developments as well as legal 
ones. Most attorneys would not have the time. Moreover, lawyers would need to think 
very hard before taking actions that would cause them to voluntarily shoulder the 
liabilities, as well as the other "burdens," that accountants carry today. 
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second~guess accounting determinations would likely create confusion. I06 So 
long as GAAP governs what constitutes a fair presentation of a company's 
financial position and results of operations, independent public accountants, 
not attorneys, \07 should make that determination. lOB 
The foregoing assessment shows that none of these criticisms of 
structured-finance opinions--{)ther than, to some degree, the first-is 
compelling. The first criticism does not, however, provide a systematically 
rigorous framework for analysis. I therefore will attempt to construct such a 
framework. 
See also William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 961, 962 (2003) (arguing that 
"[t]he cultural problem revealed by Enron ultimately is not subject to correction by teaching lawyers 
more accounting"). Professor Cunningham himself, upon reflection, may well be in agreement. Cf 
Cunningham, supra, at 1455 ("As a technical matter, the duty of competence may not call for a law 
firm's involvement in discussing appropriate accounting treatment."). 
106. See, e.g., E-mail from Richard W. Painter, Guy Raymond and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones, 
Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and newly appointed White House Chief Ethics 
Officer, to author (Feb. 13,2005) (on file with author) (observing that although the concept that a 
legal opinion should fairly present the situation is "sound in principal," it is "notoriously vague if 
used to impose liability on lawyers" and therefore might serve as a "definition of professionalism, 
but not as grounds for civil liability"). 
107. Whatever merit there may be to the recent Sarbanes-Oxley requirement for management 
certification of fair presentation, see infra note 286, lawyers-and especially outside lawyers-are 
neither trained nor sufficiently informed to judge fair presentation. But cf Coffee, supra note 84, at 
1313, 1312-15 (advocating that "the attorney principally responsible for preparing a disclosure 
document or report filed with the SEC [be required] to certify: (I) that such attorney believes the 
statements made in the document or report to be true and correct in all material respects; and (2) that 
such attorney is not aware of any additional material information whose disclosure is necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading"). 
108. This does not mean that accountants and lawyers should not attempt to work together in 
appropriate cases. Professor William Simon argues for a more fully interdisciplinary regime in 
order to avoid the possibility of a "perfect circle of lack of responsibility." William H. Simon, 
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Remarks at Columbia Law School Symposium, March 21, 2005. 
See also Cunningham, supra note lOS, at 1454: "A familiar pass-the-buck pas de deux in deal 
meetings and conference calls occurs when the accountant says, after an impasse, 'that's a legal 
problem' while the lawyer says 'that's an accounting problem.' Frequently the truth is what's not 
said: both are right. Each should be more willing to venture into the other's territory .... " A fully 
interdisciplinary regime, however, is likely to involve high transaction costs, whereas the practical 
possibility of there being a "perfect circle of lack of responsibility" is mitigated by the overlap 
between financial disclosure required under GAAP and securities-law disclosure required under 
SEC Rule IOb-5. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (observing that offering documents, 
such as prospectuses, independently must disclose any material risks in order to comply with SEC 
Rule IOb-5). 
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III. Building a Systematic Framework for Analysis 
Because there is little precedent,109 my inquiry proceeds from 
fundamental principles. First, I analyze whether constraints should bind 
structured-finance opinions and the lawyers providing them, showing that the 
main justification for imposing constraints in this context is to minimize 
externalities. Next, I examine the externalities resulting from structured-
finance opinions and the corresponding appropriateness of constraints. Finally, 
I expand that analysis to examine more generally the externalities resulting 
from, and constraints appropriate for, other third-party business-law opinions. 
(In these contexts, note that the third parties affected by opinion-generated 
externalities are not the "third-party" recipients of such opinions; the third-
109. Although there is little precedent directly on point, I have examined the tax-shelter opinion 
precedents to determine their potential applicability. Those precedents superficially appear relevant 
because they address the duties of attorneys issuing legal opinions to third-party investors, albeit in 
terms discussing the expected tax treatment of tax shelters. See also Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the 
Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REv. 43, 
57-59 (2001) (discussing how the ambiguities in tax shelter laws lead to a perception among 
opinion writers that they will not be subject to malpractice liability). The various tax-shelter 
opinions, however, turn out to be too fundamentally different to serve as precedents. Unlike 
structured-finance opinions or, indeed, any of the other third-party business-law opinions later 
discussed, tax -shelter opinions are not negotiated between sophisticated business parties but, 
instead, are typically written ex ante as marketing tools for the "promoter" of the tax shelter to help 
sell investments in the shelter. See id. at 50 (noting that one common characteristic of abusive 
corporate tax-shelter transactions is that the promoter "who markets the transaction to a large 
number of corporations bears the costs of developing the transaction and the corresponding legal 
opinions"). Moreover, the externality caused by aggressive tax avoidance--less tax revenue-is 
distributed diffusely among the public at large. Perhaps for this reason, minimization of tax liability 
traditionally has been viewed in the United States as a legitimate goal, in and of itself. See 
Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462,468 (6th Cir. 1953) (declaring that "[t]he general principle is 
well settled that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be 
his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits"). DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 
THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS 5--6 (1999), available at http://www.pmstax.comigenishelterIUSTreasShelt9907.pdf 
("[R]eliance on a transactional legislation approach to corporate tax shelters may embolden some 
promoters and participants to rush shelter products to market on the assumption that any 
Governmental reaction would be applied only on a prospective basis."); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax 
Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business 
Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REv. 47,48 (2001) ("[P]romoters regularly recycle 
old shelters that have been targeted by statutory, regulatory or interpretive changes by modifying 
some element of the transaction to avoid the literal terms of the change (narrowly read) while 
retaining the same discredited shelter objective."); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, 
Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REv. 1,4 (2004) ("Tax shelter promoters have exploited 
the move towards textualism by designing transactions that comply with the letter of the law but 
that generate results clearly never contemplated by Congress or the Treasury."). In contrast, 
structured-fmance opinions generally facilitate legitimate commercial transactions. See supra notes 
26-29 and accompanying text. 
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party recipients are effectively "contracting" parties,llo and the affected third 
parties are the public at large who invest in the originator's securities.)111 
A. What Constraints Should Bind Structured-Finance Opinions and the 
Lawyers Issuing Them? 
To begin this inquiry, recall the typical nature of structured-finance 
opinions: they are technically correct as to the matters they cover; 112 they 
address only bankruptcy law matters and make no accounting analysis; 113 and 
counsel rendering these opinions do not intend them to be used to achieve 
misleading accounting results or otherwise mislead the public. 114 What con-
straints should bind these opinions and the lawyers issuing them? 
1. Conceptual Framework for Analysis.-Many terms, some with 
overlapping meanings, \15 are used to describe why government imposes 
constraints on private parties. Scholars talk about increasing social welfare, I 16 
addressing the "tragedy of the commons,,,117 reallocating benefits and 
achieving allocative fairness, llS maintaining norms and morals,119 preserving 
110. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (observing that third-party opinion recipients are 
ordinarily involved in negotiating those opinions). 
Ill. See supra note 34 (defining externalities as infringement of rights of non contracting 
parties). In the context of structured-fmance opinions, for example, the third parties affected by 
externalities are investors in the originator; such investors are not contracting parties vis-a-vis the 
structured-finance transaction or related opinions. 
112. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
115. For example, it is implicit in the concepts of paternalism and externalities that only 
"wrongful" actions are protected against; but government itself, based at least in part on morals and 
norms, determines what is wrongful. It is also implicit in the concept of market efficiency, as 
another example, that externalities are minimized. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 179 (1993) 
("With externalities present, the market's allocation of goods is inefficient .... If firms do not have 
to pay all of the costs ... equilibrium prices will be lower and output higher than they would be if 
firms took social costs into account. "). 
116. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967 
(2001) ("Our central claim is that the welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively 
employed in evaluating legal rules. That is, legal rules should be selected entirely with respect to 
their effects on the well-being of individuals in society."). Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the common law as "a system for maximizing the 
wealth of society"). 
117. The term comes from an article by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243 (1968). A tragedy of the commons occurs when several independent persons all use 
a common and diminishable resource and their aggregate use threatens the sustainability of that 
resource. Baylor L. Johnson, Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons, 12 ENVTL. 
VALUES 271, 273 (2003) (citing Hardin). 
118. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 116, at 999-1004. 
119. E.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
IDS COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641~3 (2005) (discussing how the efforts state and federal governments 
made to protect sexual norms and public morals influenced the federalization of immigration laws); 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications For Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. 
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and enhancing the efficiency of markets,120 protecting parties from their own 
actions (paternalism),121 and protecting parties from externalities. 122 
Most of these reasons for imposing constraints do not appear to apply to 
structured-fmance opinions. Except to the extent already bound up with 
"market efficiency" or "externalities,,,123 such opinions are unlikely to impact 
social welfare, problems of the "commons," allocative fairness, morals, or 
norms. Paternalism also should not be a basis for imposing constraints because 
structured-finance opinions are invariably issued in a sophisticated business 
and finance context. 
Market efficiency clearly applies to structured-finance opinions. It should 
not, however, justify constraints because these opinions help to facilitate 
structured-finance transactions, which themselves are efficient. 124 Moreover, 
these opinions facilitate structured-finance transactions in an efficient way: 
they target the precise two elements of information asymmetry of concern to 
investors. 125 
The principal basis for governmental imposition of constraints on 
structured-fmance opinions therefore appears to be protection against 
externalities. 126 Constraints could be couched as law or, where used to 
constrain lawyer behavior per se, as ethical rules.127 Because this Article's 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1243-58 (2004) (tracing the government's use of moral-based 
reasons as justifications for lawmaking). 
120. POSNER, supra note 116, at 457; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984) (claiming that the "efficient 
capital market hypothesis" has become the dominant context "in which serious discussion about the 
regulation of the financial markets takes place"). 
121. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: The Definition 
of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004) (defining paternalism as "the restriction 
of a subject's self-regarding conduct primarily for the good of that same subject"). 
122. See, e.g., ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATNES 91, 91-123 (1982) 
("examining the concept of externalities, which may be defined as an activity that imposes costs or 
benefits upon persons who are not parties to a transaction or contract"); see also supra note 34 
(defining externalities). Protecting against externalities has long been a primary goal of 
government. See, e.g., THE MISHNAH, Tractate Avot 3:2 (Jacob Neuser trans., 1988) ("Pray for the 
welfare of the government. For if it were not for fear of it, one man would swallow his fellow 
alive.") 
123. See supra notes 120, 122 and accompanying text. I recognize, supra note 115, that these 
terms have overlapping meanings. 
124. See supra note 29 (observing that securitization, the dominant form of structured-finance 
transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable). 
125. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that investors in the SPV's securities 
require a true sale of receivables to the SPV and protection of the SPV from the originator's 
bankruptcy). I also later show that any information failure resulting from structured-finance 
transactions is caused not by these opinions but by independent investor failures. See infra notes 
153-62 and accompanying text. 
126. Recall that these externalities do not actually affect the opinion recipient-the SPV and its 
investors-but, instead, affect the originator's investors. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
127. Ethical rules derive from a subset of the above-listed reasons for governmental constraints, 
with paternalism and minimizing externalities being the most prevalent. See Benjamin Hoorn 
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and 
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analysis does not depend on the form of the constraints, !28 I will use the term 
"lawful" to refer to externalities whose causation is neither illegal nor 
government-constrained as unethical (so the term "unlawful" consequently 
references externalities whose causation is either illegal or government-
constrained as unethical).!29 
I next focus on the extent to which externalities justify governmental 
constraints and how those constraints should be applied. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to distinguish opinion-giving from the traditional role 
of lawyer as advocate. The differences necessarily cause different 
externalities, which explains why scholarship on lawyers' duties within the 
adversary legal system is mostly inapplicable to the duties of lawyers issuing 
structured-finance opinions. 130 Traditional lawyering-which focuses on 
courtroom and client advocacy in an adversary system--can facilitate 
externalities, and there is significant literature on the appropriate constraints to 
mitigate these externalities.!3! Subject to those constraints, society accepts the 
system of traditional legal advocacy. 132 
Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429,433, 436, 467-75 (2001) (arguing that the two most 
prevalent justifications for regulating the legal profession are consumer protection and minimizing 
externalities to adversaries, the court system, and the public at large (the last being referred to herein 
as "public externalities"». Although there are other reasons for ethical rules, see Sean J. Griffith, 
Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An Economic AnalysiS of Legal Ethics, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 
347, 350 (2002) (arguing that legal ethics are a response to the collective action problems and 
public criticism lawyers face, and that they exist for the collective interest of the bar), those other 
reasons are irrelevant to structured-fmance opinions per se. 
128. This Article need not differentiate, for example, between forms of governmental 
constraints, such as civil liability, criminal liability, or suspension or termination of the license to 
practice law. As used herein, the term "liability" includes all these forms of constraint. 
129. By government-constrained, I include ethical rules promulgated by nongovernmental 
bodies, such as the American Bar Association, but enforced by government power. In practice, 
constraints on public externalities caused by structured-finance opinions are more likely to be 
couched as law. Cf Barton, supra note 127, at 474-75 (arguing that the rules of professional 
conduct for lawyers do not effectively correct public externalities, and observing that most ethical 
rules that "even arguably address these externalities" are nonmandatory and occasionally hortatory). 
To the extent feasible, of course, lawyers should strive also to meet aspirational goals for conduct. 
Cf infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
130. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmILITY EC 7-3, EC 7-4 (1969) (distinguishing 
between a lawyer's role as advocate and counselor). Professor Gordon similarly makes a distinction 
between the lawyer as advocate and the lawyer as corporate counselor. Gordon, supra note 78, at 
1194-95. 
131. See, e.g., Robert P. Bums, Professional Responsibility in the Trial Court, 44 S. TEx. L. 
REv. 81, 109-10 (2002) (arguing that current ethical restraints on trial lawyers represent an 
important contribution to the fairness and effectiveness of the adversary system, but cautioning that 
certain ethical tensions between complete candor and client advocacy are inherent in that system 
and that the effects of further ethical requirements must be carefully considered before enacting 
them); Gary Hoffman & Lauren Degnan, Responding to Hardball Tactics and Questionable Tactics 
in Litigation: Limits on Advocacy, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1996, at 7 (noting the limits legal ethics place 
on an attorney's behavior as a client advocate). 
132. See, e.g., Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of 
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 147, 154, 160-61 (2002) (arguing that the 
adversary system of litigation as tempered by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is an 
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Opinion-giving can also facilitate externalities. But there is little learning 
on the appropriate constraints because these externalities are different from 
those of traditional lawyering. To understand why there are differences, 
consider how a lawyer's traditional advocacy role differs from the role of 
counsel in issuing opinions. One distinction is that, in the traditional role, there 
is invariably counsel on the other side to balance the argument and thereby 
mitigate externalities. This is not to say that this difference is black and white. 
Counsel providing third-party legal opinions-the type of opinion comprising 
virtually all structured-finance opinions133 --often have to negotiate their 
opinion with counsel for the opinion recipient. 134 
The second distinction is more clear-cut, however. Advocacy demands 
unusually creative lawyering. Where a lawyer advocates for a client, the 
lawyer's duty is to help the client win by creatively arguing that the client has 
complied with law or has a stronger case than the opposing party.l3S There are, 
of course, ethical constraints on the limits of advocacy, 136 but-subject to those 
constraints--creativity is respected and valued. 137 Likewise, where the lawyer 
advocates for a client in a negotiation, the lawyer's duty is to help the client 
reach the best deal possible by creatively arguing the merits of the client's 
position. 138 
effective and superior mechanism for obtaining truth and justice). Cf Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms 
in Legal Ethics Regulations, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 829, 854-55 (2002) (noting that "[w]ith little 
exception" the Model Rules rely on the adversary paradigm, but arguing that even where the legal 
practice takes place within the adversary system "the premises that the code drafters attribute to the 
adversary system sometimes do not hold true"). My observation is descriptive, not normative. I do 
not purport to critique the constraints on externalities resulting from traditional legal advocacy. 
133. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
134. Leslie L. Gardner, Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters, 
64 B.U. L. REv. 415, 419 n.34 (1984) ("[T]he general content of the legal opinion is usually 
negotiated prior to its issuance."); see also Guidelines, supra note 50, at 877 (outlining the 
negotiating process between opposing lawyers to determine the final form of the opinions); TriBar 
1998 Report, supra note 50, at 599-600 (explaining that all transactions are unique and, as such, 
require a certain amount of negotiation between opinion givers and opinion recipients). 
135. See, e.g., In re Am. Fin. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 76,832, [1961-1964 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,088, at 81,092 (Mar. 19, 1962) (noting that although an 
attorney "owe[s] a public responsibility," when he acts as his client's "advisor, defender, advocate 
and confidant," he enters into a "personal relationship in which his principal concern is with the 
interests and rights of his client"). 
136. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 127, at 471,473 (discussing those constraints); Griffith, supra 
note 127, at 352-75 (same). 
137. But cf Gordon, supra note 78, at 1204-07 (asserting that a corporate lawyer's loyalty 
should run to the public as well as to the client-even in an adversary proceeding-because the 
lawyer's role "is in large part a public role, designed to fulfill public purposes," as occurs when a 
criminal defense attorney argues to suppress unlawfully seized evidence and thereby deters police 
misconduct or advances one-sided, selective arguments that ultimately serve to keep prosecutors 
"up to the mark"). 
138. See In re American Fin. Co., supra note 135, ~ 81,088, at 81,092 (distinguishing the 
function of an attorney from that of a certitying accountant whose independence "may require him 
to voice public criticisms of his client's ... practices"). 
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This perspective-that traditional lawyering is all about advocacy and, 
thus, creativity-helps further explain why the well-known decision in United 
States v. Simon 139 has not been extended to lawyers, at least in their traditional 
advocacy roles. In that case, the court upheld jury instructions that an 
accountant can be liable, even though the accountant complied with both 
GAAP and generally accepted aUditing standards, if certified fmancial 
statements do not "fairly present" the company's financial condition and 
results of operations.140 This decision reflects that an accountant's goal in 
auditing a company and certifying the accuracy of its financial statements is 
fair and objective presentation of the company's fmancial state. 141 Few if any 
would say that that goal is, or can be, achieved through the use of creative 
accounting.142 Fair and objective presentation, thus, is fundamentally different 
from the goals of traditional legal advocacy. 
In contrast, an opining lawyer's goal-to accurately predict a given legal 
state by applying law to fact143-is closer to accounting goals than to the goals 
of traditional legal advocacy. Technical accuracy must be valued more than 
creativity, and indeed creativity that undermines accuracy must be eschewed. 
These differences necessarily cause externalities different from those resulting 
from traditional legal advocacy, thereby muddling the legal-opinion debate. 
I next examine to what extent these different externalities justify legal or 
ethical constraints on structured-fmance opinions. 
2. Examination of Extemalities.-By definition, externalities caused by 
structured-fmance opinions affect the public, not the originator or the opinion 
recipient. l44 For purposes of the analysis that follows, it is useful to divide 
these externalities into two categories: lawful externalities and unlawful 
externalities. 
139. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). 
140. Id at 805---06 (affirming the trial judge's decision that compliance with GAAP could not 
constitute a complete defense: "[T]he 'critical test' was whether the financial statements as a whole 
'fairly presented the fmancial position of [the Company]"'). 
141. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified Professional Accountants (AlCPA) Code of 
Professional Conduct §§ 53.01, 53.03 (emphasizing the accounting profession's dedication to 
"objectivity," "integrity," and "a genuine interest in serving the public"); § 51.02 (acknowledging 
"the [accounting] profession's recognition of its responsibilities to the public, to clients, and to 
colleagues") (emphasis added). 
142. But compare this goal to an accountant's more purely advocacy roles, such as helping a 
client minimize taxes. Here the accountant, like an attorney, values creativity, and the law respects 
that. Cf Chamberlain v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 1953) ("The general principle is well 
settled that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his 
taxes ... and that the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation will not establish liability if the 
transaction does not do so without it."). 
143. See supra notes 53, 63 and accompanying text (citing various sources describing an 
opining lawyer's role). 
144. Cf supra notes 34 (defining externalities as harm to noncontracting parties), III and 
accompanying text. 
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All transactions, including structured-finance transactions, create 
externalities. 145 Therefore, any time a lawyer issues a legal opinion that 
effectuates a transaction, the lawyer is participating in creating externalities. 
However, the paradigm of social ordering is that, left to independent bar-
gaining, parties work out arrangements that-except to the extent the 
arrangements create unlawful externalities 146-benefit the overall public 
goOd. 147 To the extent lawyers facilitate these arrangements, they are working 
to enhance the public good. This suggests that lawyers should have the right to 
help facilitate lawful transactional arrangements by issuing legal opinions. A 
fortiori, they should have the right to help facilitate lawful structured-finance 
transactions by issuing structured-finance opinions. 
In a business context, the primary limitation on the social-ordering 
paradigm is that the arrangements should not create externalities that society 
defines as unlawful. 148 Lawyers specifically help in this regard by advising 
145. Cf STONE, supra note 122, at 97 (observing that "[s]trictly speaking, virtually every 
activity involves an externality"). 
146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (observing this limitation on the social-ordering 
paradigm). 
147. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 291-92,547-48 n.292 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford University Press 1993) (1776): 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the 
annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends 
to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
See also Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & 
ECON. 131, 132 (1984) (asserting that courts should use "wealth maximization" as a guide to 
judicial action where "the goal of such action is to bring about the allocation of resources that 
makes the economic pie as large as possible, irrespective of the relative slices"); Michel Rosenfeld, 
Contract and Justice: The Relationship Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract 
Theory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769, 847 (1985) (arguing that the "fact that parties in pursuit of self-
interest agree to an exchange indicates that the exchange in question is likely to enhance allocative 
efficiency. Furthermore, the fine tuning arising out of the bargaining process serves the common 
good by assuring that increased value is purchased at the lowest possible expense. Reciprocity, 
then, not only permits the alignment of individual self-interest and the common good, but it does so 
in a manner that ... is very reminiscent of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand"'). 
148. Persons injured by externalities that society does not define as unlawful sometimes have 
the right to recover damages from parties causing those externalities-thereby effectively shifting 
the externalities back onto those parties. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 116, at 383-85 (discussing 
the optimal choice between "two methods of public control-the common law system of privately 
enforced rights [i.e., the right to recover damages from parties causing externalities] and the 
administrative system of direct public control"). Although this right to recover damages, where it 
exists, supplements the social-ordering paradigm, it does not alter this Article's fundamental 
analysis because of its self-correcting nature (i.e., shifting externalities back onto the parties causing 
them). 
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clients on whether their arrangements are lawful. Lawyers therefore are social 
engineers contributing to this social-ordering paradigm.149 
If lawyers were constrained from providing opinions to effectuate 
bargained-for lawful business transactions that nonetheless may cause 
externalities, they would be forced to substitute their judgment about 
externalities for that of their clients. From an information standpoint, however, 
clients generally have more and better information about the consequences of a 
transaction, other than the transaction's legality. The clients therefore are 
better positioned to make business decisions. Imposing a duty on lawyers to 
second-guess their clients' business decisions would be inefficient. lso This 
insight helps explain Congressional testimony on the role of lawyers m 
rendering legal opinions: 
If a transaction is not illegal and has been approved by the appropriate 
levels of corporation's management, lawyers ... may appropriately 
provide the requisite legal advice and opinions about legal issues 
relating to the transactions [sic]. 
In doing so, the lawyers are not approving of the business decisions that 
were made by their clients. lSI 
Indeed, it is hard to see exactly how lawyers could be constrained from 
providing opinions on transactions that create lawful externalities. Lawyers, 
who are specialists only in law, would be ill-trained to assess and weigh the 
costs (including externalities) and benefits of business transactions being 
facilitated by their opinions. How, for example, would counsel asked to opine 
on a proposed break-up leveraged buyoutlS2 balance costs and benefits where 
the resulting transaction creates a more efficient business but, in the process, 
costs a thousand jobs, impoverishes a community, and destroys families? 
Constraining lawyers from opining on lawful transactions that may cause 
externalities would thus appear to be unworkable in practice. 
149. Cf generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) (describing lawyers as transaction-cost engineers, and 
describing how legal opinions can reduce information-asymmetry costs). 
150. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer 
of the Court", 48 BUFF. L. REv. 349, 387-88 (2000) (cautioning against "[c]laims that lawyers 
should be free to disobey the client's lawful instructions"); Sean J. Griffith, Afterward and 
Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1223, 1234 n.43 (2003) 
(cautioning that "[v ]aguely defined duties to 'the public' threaten to increase the agency costs of the 
legal representation as lawyers may seek to pursue their own ideological goals in favor of client 
interests"). 
151. The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 4: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Congo 20 (2002) (statement of 
Joseph C. Dilg, Managing Partner, Vinson & Elkins). 
152. For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance law in the LBO context and the no-fraudulent-
conveyance opinions required as a condition to funding, see generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas 
H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 850-54 
(1985); Raymond J. Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to Leveraged 
Buyouts, 42 DUKE L.J. 340 (1992). 
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The social-ordering paradigm would be undermined, nonetheless, to the 
extent expert advisors, such as lawyers and accountants, provide inaccurate 
information that distorts transactional arrangements. This distortion could be 
especially significant in a structured-finance transaction context, where legal 
opinions and accounting disclosures are such a vital part of the information 
flow. And, admittedly, sometimes there is an information failure: the 
"masking" of liabilities that only first become evident when a company goes 
bankrupt. 153 
This information failure, however, is generally not the result of inaccurate 
information provided by lawyers,154 nor is it likely the result of inaccurate 
information provided by accountants. Although this information failure might 
be exacerbated by a dual-information problem-legal-opinion information is 
accurately provided for one purpose, bankruptcy, but is then used somewhat 
out of context for another purpose, accountingl55-it does not primarily result 
from that dichotomy. The underlying rationale behind off-balance-sheet 
accounting is consistent with the bankruptcy opinion: the financial assets in 
question have been sold. 156 GAAP views the bankruptcy opinion as merely a 
convenient indicator of the sale.157 
The real information failure is the occasional investor failure to 
understand, much less appreciate, underlying disclosure concerning structured-
finance transactions. This can occur for at least two reasons. One is that 
investors-even sophisticated investors--do not always carefully review the 
disclosure. They often focus, for example, exclusively on a company's 
balance sheet without regard to contingent risks disclosed in the footnotes l58 
and offering documents. 159 Although some investors might fail to focus on 
these risks due to laziness, the more likely explanation for the failure is a 
fundamental lack of comprehension that these risks can be significant, 
resulting from a misunderstanding of the necessary and significant role of 
contingent recourse in the sale of the financial assets. Because of information 
asymmetries between sellers (in the structured-finance context, originators) 
and buyers (in the structured-fmance context, SPVs), a buyer of fmancial 
assets l60 always must demand, to the extent consistent with a true sale, some 
153. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that structured-finance opinions are 
typically accurate regarding the legal matters they purport to cover). 
155. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
156. See FAS 140, supra note 6, ~ 27. 
157. /d. 
158. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
159. Offering documents, such as prospectuses, must independently disclose any material risks 
in order to comply with SEC Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (2005). Cf Cunningham, supra 
note 105, at 1454 ("For any business transaction, there is an accounting consequence and in tum or 
simultaneously a disclosure consequence. They are related."). 
160. Recall that structured-finance transactions involve the sale of financial assets. See supra 
note 5. 
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amount of contingent recourse against the seller. 161 This recourse is a 
necessary solution to the problem of quality uncertainty. 162 
There is no question that this recourse must be disclosed. Law and 
accounting standards have long required disclosure of all realistic liabilities, 
including contingent recourse,163 and even "reasonably possible" contingent 
liabilities must be disclosed in the footnotes to the originator's balance sheet. l64 
Investors, however, generally tend to be familiar with ordinary sales of 
tangible assets, in which contingent recourse, when it exists, is typically 
limited to standard warranties. They therefore do not always comprehend that 
a sale might expose the seller to this greater level of contingent recourse. The 
obvious solution to this failure is to educate investors to carefully read and 
understand the disclosure, including the footnotes to financial statements, to 
ascertain and assess the possible contingent recourse. 165 To some extent, this 
education has already begun.166 
The second reason that investors occasionally fail to understand and 
appreciate underlying disclosure is that some structured-finance and other 
business transactions are so complex that disclosure is necessarily imperfect-
it either oversimplifies the transaction or provides detail and intricacy beyond 
the comprehension level of even the most sophisticated investors and securities 
analysts. 167 In the latter case, even if investors and analysts considered hiring 
teams of experts, information asymmetries would remain. 168 This does not 
161. See, e.g., Peter C. Pantaleo et aI., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial 
Assets, 52 Bus. LAW. 159, 163 (1996) (discussing the importance of contingent recourse in the sale 
of intangible assets); Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1316 n.38 (observing that "although 
securitization deals do shift actual risk, they always require the company originating the deal [the 
originator] to retain sufficient first-loss risk on the transferred assets ... to minimize the [SPY] 
investor risk to an investment grade leveL... [This recourse] logically follows from the 
asymmetric information between the [originator] and the SP[Vl's investors"). 
162. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,499 (1970) (referring to guaranties, which include what my Article 
terms "recourse"). Although Akerlof suggested other potential solutions to the problem of quality 
uncertainty, only the guarantee, or recourse, solution applies to the fact scenario of this Article. 
163. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
165. Ascertaining the amount of contingent recourse and the likelihood that it will be asserted is 
not a trivial task. See supra note 18 (examining whether contingent recourse could be disclosed 
more prominently than in footnotes, perhaps even as a separate accounting category, but concluding 
that such disclosure would remove the filter of an accountant making an informed assessment of the 
transaction and associated recourse, resulting in an information dump that would make it harder, not 
easier, for investors to make informed investment decisions; and also concluding that if merely the 
existence of contingent recourse were prominently disclosed, investors would have insufficient 
information to assess the risk, often misleading investors into believing that the company is riskier 
than it really is). 
166. See supra note 15 (observing that, post-Enron, investors have been widely educated to 
carefully review financial-statement footnotes as part of their investment or credit decisions). 
167. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 18. 
168. See id. at 13-16 (explaining why institutional investors and securities analysts do not 
always fully understand disclosure of complex transactions). To summarize this explanation, at 
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necessarily mean that government should ban these transactions. 169 There are 
other solutions. In addition to mandating disclosure, for example, government 
could require management to be free of material conflicts of interest stemming 
from complex transactions for which disclosure may be insufficient. 170 Note 
that 
[t]he rationale for this rule is that, in the face of complexity, investors 
must rely not only on disclosure, but also on the business judgment of 
management in setting up complex transactions for the company's 
benefit. To that end, the law similarly should focus on, in addition to 
disclosure, requiring management to be free of conflicts of interest that 
would affect management's judgment in those transactions. This focus 
would have prevented the conflicts of interest that allowed, and indeed 
encouraged, the Enron abuses to thrive. 171 
The foregoing analysis shows that the real information failure in 
structured-finance transactions is unrelated to legal opinions per se and has 
solutions that are likewise unrelated. Although the information failure is in-
directly related to structured-finance opinions-insofar as such opinions 
facilitate structured-finance transactions, which can cause information 
failure-the solutions discussed above appear preferable to proscribing 
structured-finance transactions (and thus proscribing the issuance of structured-
finance opinions) as a means of mitigating the information failure. 172 The 
some level of complexity the costs of hiring experts will exceed, or at least appear to exceed, any 
potential gain because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the benefit gained from fully 
understanding complex transactions is intangible and harder to quantify. The more complex the 
transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be 
out of equilibrium. Furthermore, market imperfections reduce the value of hiring expert analysts. 
Scholars have found, for example, that investment-fund managers who, believing a stock is 
overvalued, nonetheless follow the crowd will not be blamed if the stock ultimately crashes. This 
imperfection is exacerbated by the typically limited time horizon of analyst employment; the analyst 
may no longer be at the same job if and when a crash occurs, so accountability may be low to begin 
with. On the flip side, even where analysts remain at the same job, they may lose their expertise 
over time: they presumably were hired because of their structured-transaction expertise; but 
structured-transaction markets evolve and, as analysts, they would no longer be employed doing 
market deals. Moreover, these market imperfections are consistent with the results that would be 
predicted by behavioral psychology. There also are practical limitations on understanding 
complexity. The complexity problem affects investors in the originator's securities, yet those 
investors are not necessarily the same institutions that participate in structured transactions-and 
thus are less capable of understanding the complexity. Even where they are the same institutions, 
the analysts reviewing the disclosure will not likely be, and may be prohibited from being, the 
structured-transaction specialists. !d. 
169. See id. at 21-23 (examining the consequences of proscribing complex transactions that 
result in significant information asymmetry, and concluding that regulators should not want to 
proscribe these transactions as a means of controlling information failure). 
170. [d. at 31-32, 35-36 (discussing this "second-best" solution). 
171. [d. at 37. 
172. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1551-74 (arguing that securitization, the dominant form 
of structured-finance transaction, is efficient, fair, and economically desirable); see also Schwarcz, 
supra note 18, at 21-23 (showing why regulators should not want to proscribe structured-finance 
transactions as a means of controlling information failure). 
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information failure therefore should not affect this Article's normative 
argument: where lawyers facilitate lawful transactions that create problematic 
externalities, the focus should be not on lawyer conduct but instead on whether 
to legally prohibit those transactions--or at least to subject the companies that 
engage in them to liability in order to shift the externalities back onto those 
companies. 173 To the extent these transactions are lawful, lawyers should 
indeed have the rightl74 to "assist corporate managers to inflict enormous 
damage and then argue ... that they are only doing the job they are supposed 
to do."I75 Under the social-ordering paradigm,I76 lawyers acting in this fashion 
will, overall, benefit the social goOd. l77 
The foundation of this Article's framework, therefore, is that lawyers 
should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate lawful structured-
finance transactions. Completing the framework, though, requires resolving 
two ancillary issues. In assessing lawfulness, should attorneys examine the 
entire transaction or just the portion thereof relating to the opinion? And what 
should lawfulness mean in a world of changing norms? 
3. In Assessing Lawfolness, Should Attorneys Examine the Entire 
Transaction or Just the Portion Thereof Relating to the Opinion?-In a perfect 
universe, attorneys should examine an entire transaction to ensure that their 
opinion does not inadvertently help to facilitate unlawful transactions. Our 
universe, though, is imperfect-it has costs. From a cost-benefit standpoint, 
reviewing an entire transaction, where only a portion need be examined to 
render an opinion, does not appear warranted. For this reason, a lawyer 
retained by an originator solely to provide a structured-finance opinion would 
not be expected to assess the transaction's overall legality, and he certainly 
would not be paid for work performed in making that assessment. 178 As a 
practical matter, moreover, as outside lawyers specialize further and companies 
173. See supra note 148. 
174. That right being subject, of course, to the overriding right of a lawyer to resign if he or she 
believes the representation is immoral or improper. 
175. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1190. 
176. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (describing this paradigm). 
177. Consider also the extent to which lawyers' opinion letters, especially in public-law fields, 
are essentially private ordering and whether the literature on private ordering adds to or informs the 
foregoing normative framework. Compare Schwarcz, supra note 37, at 346-47 (pointing to the role 
that private-ordering plays in the development of GAAP), with Freeman, supra note 26, at 377 
(observing that "[t]here is inherent in the idea of the lawyer's being favored with a monopoly 
license to practice law the premise that his performance as a professional will be subjected to self-
regulation by the lawyer himself and to more formal regulation by the profession as a whole"). A 
private-ordering perspective could be particularly relevant to structured-finance opinions because 
accounting is an explicitly delegated form of private ordering, in which the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (F ASB) effectively acts as an agent of the SEC and individual accountants 
effectively act as subagents. Schwarcz, supra note 37, at nn.37-38 and accompanying text; id. at 
320 n.8. 
178. De Sear E-mail, supra note 20. 
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bring even more of their day-to-day work in-house, it is increasingly likely that 
counsel retained to provide third-party legal opinions will see only those 
aspects of the transaction relevant to counsel's opinion, not the entire 
transaction. 
There are at least two ways to curtail externalities without necessarily 
requiring counsel to examine the entire transaction. A minimalist approach, 
proposed earlier in this Article,179 is to permit counsel to assume legality if the 
portion of the transaction relevant to their opinion is lawful and, in the course 
of preparing due diligence for their opinion, such counsel do not spot warning 
signs putting them on notice of problems. Where counsel do spot warning 
signs, they should investigate further before issuing their opinion. 180 The logic 
of this approach is its pragmatic balancing of costs and benefits. 
In that context, the scope and the purpose of any such investigation 
should be limited. Opining counsel cannot feasibly investigate for fraud in the 
way that a district attorney would investigate. That investigation-normally 
performed by litigators-would be time consuming and expensive, and no 
client would pay for its cost. Rather, opining counsel should investigate 
sufficiently to see if the warning sign, which may well be ambiguous, can be 
dispelled and the requested opinion given. If the warning sign cannot be 
dispelled, or if other warning signs emerge, the lawyer should decline to give 
the opinion and, in appropriate circumstances, withdraw from the 
representation. 181 Whether the lawyer also should have some duty to inform 
government regulators is beyond the scope of this Article. 182 
This approach is tied, of course, to the need to defme what constitutes 
warning signS.183 It would be too limiting for this Article, in a vacuum of fact, 
to attempt to supply that definition. Because warning signs are more easily 
recognized than defined, the defmition should develop on a case-by-case 
basis. 184 For exarnple, a refusal by in-house counsel to issue a requested no-
179. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. 
180. See supra text accompanying note 91 (proposing this approach). 
181. Cf Coffee, supra note 84, at 1297, 1302-10 (arguing that securities lawyers should 
function as "gatekeepers"-a role borne by "independent professionals who are so positioned that, 
if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some 
transaction or to maintain some desired status"-when they detect problems with a corporation's 
securities disclosure); Small, supra note 75, at 1199 (arguing that when an attorney is "on notice of 
facts which, if inquired into, would disclose that he could not render an opinion, he may be guilty of 
such recklessness that his activities [in rendering a legal opinion] should be proscribed even if he 
was not a conscious or knowing participant in a violation ofiaw"). 
182. See, e.g., Valerie Breslin & Jeff Dooley, Whistle Blowing v. Confidentiality: Can 
Circumstances Mandate Attorneys to Expose Their Clients?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719 (2002) 
(outlining the controversy surrounding noisy withdrawal in the legal field). 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
184. This approach follows the judicial litmus test of "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Supreme Court adopted a similar test 
for adjudicating pornography cases. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (inquiring 
"whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the 
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violation-of-Iaw opinionl85 certainly should constitute a warning sign. So too 
should a request that opining counsel make an apparently unreasonable 
assumption. 186 The existence of undisclosed side agreements is another clear 
warning sign. 187 Although failure to see a business purpose in a transaction 
also might be a warning sign,188 that devolves on what constitutes a business 
purpose. Raising financing or reducing its cost should always be a good 
business purpose. 189 So too should shifting risk on assets to outside 
investors l90 or diversifying a company's funding sources. l9l Mitigating taxes 
often has been viewed as a legitimate business purpose.l92 At least until 
recently, it even could be argued that achieving an accounting treatment 
permitted by GAAP is itself a legitimate business purpose.193 Courts should 
also exercise caution against fmding warning signs where none exist. Thus, as 
previously discussed,194 the fact that a structured-finance transaction has loan-
like economics should not itself constitute a warning sign. 
Another approach that curtails externalities without requiring counsel 
issuing the structured-finance opinion to examine the entire transaction is to 
supplement the minimalist approach by an additional requirement: counsel 
should obtain, in appropriate cases and as part of their due diligence, an 
opinion from other counsel to the originator-typically in-house counsel-that 
the overall transaction does not violate law (a "no-violation-of-Iaw" 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476,489 (1957»). 
185. See infra text accompanying note 195. 
186. Cf United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that once an 
accountant has reason to believe that a basic assumption is false, the accountant must "extend his 
procedures to determine whether or not [his] suspicions are justified"). 
187. See, e.g., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Comm. of the Board of 
Directors of Enron Corp. 41-42,49-50,52 (Feb. 1,2002) (observing that the financing structure 
Enron created for the Chewco SPY was at least 50% short of the required third-party equity needed 
for accounting nonconsolidation because a portion of such equity was protected by undisclosed 
reserve accounts funded by Enron). 
188. See, e.g., Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 23 (June 2004) 
('''If a lawyer can't come up with a good business reason for what she is doing, the lesson [of 
Enron] is to think twice about it.'" (quoting Shaun Martin, legal ethics professor at University of 
San Diego». 
189. See Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (distinguishing lawful securitization, aimed 
at obtaining lower cost financing through disintermediation, from unlawful balance-sheet 
manipUlation). 
190. See id. 
191. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 10, at 143 (discussing diversification as one of many 
benefits of asset securitization). 
192. Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462,468,470-71 (6th Cir. 1953). 
193. A recent SEC staff report criticizes that business purpose. See infra note 280. But cf 
Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315 (differentiating securitization used to keep debts off a 
company's balance sheet from Enron's use ofSPVs). 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. 
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opinion). 195 Thus, structured-fmance counsel may assume legality if: (i) the 
portion of the transaction relevant to their opinion is lawful; (ii) counsel obtain 
a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion from in-house counsel; and (iii) counsel (in the 
course of preparing the remaining due diligence for their opinion) do not spot 
warning signs that put them on notice of problems. Where counsel do spot 
warning signs, they should investigate further before issuing their opinion. 
This Article is agnostic as to whether the minimalist approach should 
always be supplemented through a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion. Requiring 
such an opinion, even from in-house counsel, can be costlyl96 and would not be 
a panacea. 197 Imposing such a requirement would also be inconsistent to some 
extent with the existing norm that companies generally have no obligation to 
retain counsel when engaging in business transactions. Even absent that 
requirement, however, structured-finance counsel sometimes may want the 
additional assurance provided by a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion. 
Irrespective of the approach selected, transactions that are lawful today 
sometimes might be suspect tomorrow. I next examine what lawfulness means 
in a world of changing laws and norms. 
4. What Should Lawfulness Mean in a World of Changing Laws and 
Norms?-Lawfulness ultimately derives from a society's norms, and norms 
change in response to changing conditions. Where positive law reflects 
existing norms, lawfulness should be clear. But where there are disconnects 
195. Cf Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 210-12 (defining and commenting on the scope of 
this type of opinion). In appropriate cases, opining counsel might also want to ask for a "due 
authorization" opinion stating that the transaction in question has been duly authorized. Easier 
Path, supra note 42, at 1912-14. 
196. See FITzGIBBON & GLAZER, supra note 44, § 13.2.1, at 429 (noting that issuing a no-
violation-of-Iaw opinion covering alllaws could take "weeks of work by a team of lawyers"). 
197. At least under today's customary practice (as codified in ABA guidelines), no-violation-
of-law opinions are viewed as covering only "law ... that, given the nature of the transaction and 
the parties to it, a lawyer in the relevant jurisdiction exercising customary diligence would 
reasonably recognize as being applicable." TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 662. 
Furthermore, unless explicitly agreed, these opinions are viewed (again, under today's customary 
practice as codified in ABA guidelines) as excluding examination of certain laws that may be 
clearly applicable. GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 63, § 13.2.2.7, at 457-58 (observing that 
some lawyers ordinarily consider the antitrust, securities, insolvency, and tax laws excludable from 
examination unless explicitly addressed). Although delivery of a no-violation-of-Iaw opinion might 
well imply that opining counsel is unaware of other legal problems (including problems in the 
excluded areas of law), some might argue that any such inference is inappropriate in the absence of 
due diligence. See Telephone Interview with Donald W. Glazer, Co-chair, TriBar Opinion 
Committee, in Durham, N.C. (June 20, 2005) (observing that lawyers cannot make responsible 
judgments, even regarding negative assurance, without going through some process of diligence). 
Cf Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, 
Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings, 59 Bus. LAW. 1513, 1515 (2004) (observing that 
"[I]awyers customarily provide negative assurance in connection with [securities] offerings based 
on their review, within the limited time available, of the offering document and the documents 
incorporated by reference, as supplemented by their knowledge of the Company's affairs gained in 
prior representation"). 
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between posItIve law and nonns or disconnects between the positive law 
applicable at the time an opinion is given and the time of an adjudication (i.e., 
disconnects over time), lawfulness may be ambiguous. 
Disconnects between positive law and nonns can occur in one of two 
ways. At the time an opinion is given, the transaction (or portion thereof that 
should be examined) can comply with either positive law but not nonns, or 
nonns but not positive law. 198 In the fIrst case, lawyers theoretically should 
have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate those transactions. The 
rationale is that lawyers and opinion recipients must rely on objective 
standards, and the existence of positive law is such a standard. 199 Nonns, in 
contrast, represent what the law should be, which is often unsettled if not 
controversial. This Article, for example, makes nonnative claims with which, 
I anticipate, some may disagree. 
In practice, though, it is risky to issue opinions to help facilitate 
transactions that violate nonns. Even where those nonns are not yet 
incorporated into positive law, issuing these opinions just looks bad. That, in 
tum, can lead to reputational loss-such as when the transaction is scrutinized 
by a Congressional committee or in the press as the poster child for why the 
law should be changed. Issuing these opinions may also tempt some judges, 
where the public suffers losses, to apply a flawed syllogism. The public is 
hanned. These opinions are a sine qua non of the harm, and lawyers are the 
only deep pockets.z°o Therefore, lawyers should be liable for the harm. 
Issuing opinions to help facilitate transactions that violate nonns, even where 
lawful, is unwise. 
Turning now to the second disconnect, lawyers clearly should have no 
right to render opinions that help facilitate transactions that comply with nonns 
but not positive law. The rationale is, again, that lawyers and opinion 
recipients must rely on objective standards.z°1 Positive law provides such a 
198. The remaining permutations occur when, at the time the opinion is given, the transaction 
complies with both norms and positive law, or neither norms nor positive law. When a transaction 
complies with neither norms nor positive law, it is patently unlawful; lawyers then should have no 
right to help facilitate it (by issuing opinions or otherwise). When a transaction complies with both 
norms and positive law, it might appear that lawyers have a clear right to facilitate it. Even then, 
however, I show that lawyers may be criticized and, wrongly, subjected to liability. See infra text 
accompanying notes 217-31 (discussing retroactive application oflaw). 
199. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprndence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1889, 2123 (1995) (discussing why lawyers typically rely upon black-letter rules of 
positive law). 
200. Cf JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULA nON 346 
(2d ed. 1997) (suggesting that "large [law] firms [are] the most appealing targets because they have 
the deepest pockets"); Nathan Koppel, Partial Protection-Plaintiffs Face a Supreme Court Barrier 
When Suing Law Firms for Fraud, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 77 ("Law firms are an alluring deep 
pocket for defrauded investors."); see also Lipson, supra note 60, at 5 ("A number of the lawyers 
interviewed for this project said that they thought that lawyers were becoming increasingly 
attractive targets when transactions fail, and that opinion letters would form an important link in the 
chain leading to liability."). 
201. Ewald, supra note 199, at 2123. 
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standard; norms do not. Thus, even though the legal and ethical constraints 
that allowed the opinions in Enron reflected the norms of that time-an 
"adversary stance of companies toward regulation and regulators,,,202 the 
increased competition among law fIrms for client business,203 and the then-
dominance "of the cults of market economism and shareholder-wealth-
maximization as supreme goods,,204-lawyers should not have given those 
opinions if the transactions they facilitated violated positive law.20s 
These disconnects between positive law and norms can be relatively easy 
cases compared to disconnects over time. Sometimes a transaction complies 
with positive law when the opinion is given (ex ante), but positive law 
thereafter changes to make the transaction unlawful. The question then arises: 
Did counsel have the right to issue that opinion? The obvious response is yes, 
especially where the transaction complied, ex ante, with norms as well as 
positive law. Some precedents, however, are troubling. There are two 
scenarios: one where ex post positive law is not-and the more troublesome 
scenario where ex post positive law is-viewed as retroactive. 
The fIrst scenario, where ex post positive law is not viewed as retroactive, 
is the more common. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides an example. As 
mentioned, the norms governing transactions prior to the Enron and 
W orldCom scandals included an adversary stance of companies toward 
regulation and regulators and a dominance of market economism and share-
holder wealth maximization?06 After those and other corporate failures, 
however, investor confIdence in markets needed to be re-established. That 
confIdence required a showing that "leadership knows what it is doing and that 
rational [people] are handling the nation's businesses rationally.,,207 
Government attempted to accomplish this showing by enacting Sarbanes-
Oxley,208 which subjects businesses to more stringently protective laws and 
standards for behavior.209 This type of reaction is typical, as illustrated by the 
enactment of the federal securities laws in response to the Great Depression of 
202. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1209. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. Professor Gordon argues that these factors eviscerated the "statesman-advisor" norm 
of lawyering, discussed supra note 78. 
205. This second disconnect between positive law and norms creates a temptation, of course, to 
test the boundaries of positive law. Lawyers ought to have the right to do that, so long as those 
boundaries are not actually violated. 
206. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
207. 'ADAM SMITH', THE MONEY GAME 236-37 (1968). 
208. See supra note 16. 
209. Likewise, corporations and other private parties themselves may attempt to increase 
market confidence by changing the norms by which they behave. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 26, 
at 413 ("In an age when the chief executive officer of the world's largest corporation feels 
compelled to make a public apology to a private citizen, it is only natural that members of a 
profession historically vested with a public trust be held to a standard of accountability that 
accurately reflects the tenor of the times."). 
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1929-1933;210 the aggressive enforcing of existing laws, especially against 
individuals, in response to the National Student Marketing debacle of the 
1970s;211 and the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREAiI2 in response to the savings and loan 
failures of the 1980s. 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley clearly codifies changing norms into positive 
law, it does not appear to make its standards retroactive. A recent court 
decision confirms that view, at least in the context of retroactively extending 
certain statutes of limitation.213 Section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley creates a new 
five-year statute of limitations for private securities-fraud cases, and plaintiffs 
claimed that § 804 retroactively extended their lapsed, shorter statutes of 
limitation?14 The court disagreed, reasoning that neither the language of that 
section nor legislative history suggests that Congress intended retroactive 
application.215 
The second, and more troublesome, disconnect over time occurs where ex 
post positive law is viewed as retroactive?16 Unlike retroactive criminal laws, 
which (at least in the United States and the European Union) are invalid,217 
retroactive non-criminal law is often upheld.2I8 This is true even under 
international legal principles, so long as the retroactive law is non-
210. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("The primary purpose of 
the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities 
market."); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (3d ed. 2001) ("[T]he Great 
Depression and the market collapse in October 1929 ... provided the political momentum for 
congressional action that would over the course of a decade produce a collection of acts known as 
the federal securities laws. "). 
211. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 26, at 414 (observing that to "bolster confidence in the 
securities markets" after that debacle, the SEC took enforcement action against individuals to 
"impress[] corporate managements and their advisors with the magnitude of their responsibilities 
under the securities laws and with the potential for personal and professional humiliation as a 
penalty for failure to discharge those responsibilities"). 
212. Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.c.). 
213. In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401,406 (2d Cir. 2004). 
214. Id. at 403. 
215. Id. at 406-08. 
216. Conceptually, this is most likely to occur (but is not limited to situations) when there is a 
retrospective disconnect between positive law and norms, so that ex post positive law reflects ex 
ante norms. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil 
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2158 (1996) ("Retroactivity enhances the ability of a 
current majority to fashion policies responsive to contemporary interests."). 
217. Retroactive, or ex post facto, criminal laws violate Article I, Sections 9 and 10, of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1798) (holding that only criminal, not civil, 
ex post facto laws violate the Constitution). They also generally violate Section I, Article 7, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Restrictions on ex post facto criminal law are sometimes 
referred to as nulla poena sine lege ("no penalty without a law"). 
218. See, e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,267 (1994) (explaining that, absent a 
violation of a specific Constitutional provision, "the potential unfairness of retroactive civil 
legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope"); Krent, 
supra note 216, at 2149 ("The Court has generally sustained any retroactive enactment in the 
economic sphere that is supported by a plausible public purpose."). 
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discriminatory.219 Retroactivity can be implicit or explicit, although the former 
has no clear legal basis.22o 
The practical problem with retroactive law, of course, is that parties 
violating it cannot know, at the time of their action, of the violation. Even 
where parties sense they may be violating norms, that is not per se unlawful. 221 
In a business and financial context, if not in other contexts, retroactive laws 
therefore undermine the certainty and objectivity needed to structure 
transactions.222 
Moreover, where the retroactive law concerns a politically sensitive topic 
there is potential for abuse.223 Consider, for example, the much-criticized 
regulatory action taken, under FIRREA, by the U.S. Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) against the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & 
Handler?24 Kaye, Scholer had been retained as litigation counsel for Lincoln 
Savings & Loan Association in an adversarial relationship with the OTS.225 
Lincoln subsequently failed, being $2.6 billion insolvent.226 Almost two years 
later, the OTS filed its regulatory action against Kaye, Scholer, alleging 
essentially that the law firm failed to disclose Lincoln's actual financial 
219. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 918-21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing retroactivity in the context of expropriation and confiscation, 
and concluding that it is permitted so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary). 
220. For an example of dubiously legal implicit retroactivity, see infra notes 224-31 and 
accompanying text (discussing the OTS case against Kaye, Scholer). 
221. Cf supra note 216 (noting that retroactive lawmaking most likely occurs when there is a 
retrospective disconnect between positive law and norms, so that ex post positive law reflects ex 
ante norms). 
222. See, e.g., George Clemon Freeman, Jr., A Public Policy Essay: Superfund Retroactivity 
Revisited, 50 BuS. LAW. 663, 682-83 (1995) ("The key to continuing investments in productive 
enterprises, and to the availability of insurance to facilitate those investments, is predictability. 
Predictability in turn is dependent upon a stable legal system where those who must make decisions 
on whether or not to act or how to act, and those who must decide whether or not to insure them and 
if so at what price, can do so with fairly accurate knowledge of the likely legal 
consequences .... Retroactive legislation ... is antithetical to predictability."). 
223. This potential for abuse to some extent reflects the previously discussed flawed syllogism: 
The public is harmed; legal opinions are a sine qua non of the harm, and the opining lawyers are the 
only deep pockets; therefore, those lawyers should be liable for the harm. See supra note 200 and 
accompanying text. Objectively, however, lawyers should not be liable if the transactions they 
opined on did not violate positive law when their opinions were given. See supra note 199 and 
accompanying text. But see Freeman, supra note 26, at 375 (observing that, in 1973, "times have 
changed" and thus "[r]esponsibilities that were never recognized previously have now come into 
view"); id. at 376 (contending that "as attorneys come to be idealized as the 'due diligence men' and 
the 'corporate conscience,' they must expect that the changing times will require of them a stricter 
accountability for their actions") (citations omitted). 
224. The author discloses that he was a partner of Kaye, Scholer at the time of this regulatory 
action, though not at the time Kaye, Scholer engaged in any actions alleged to be problematic. The 
author therefore was not involved in the regulatory action. 
225. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 200, at 341. 
226. HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 419 (1999) (quoting James O. Johnston & Daniel S. Schecter, Kaye, Scholer and the 
OTS-Did Anyone Go Too Far?, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 977,979-83 (1993)). 
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condition to the OTS's predecessor.227 Kaye, Scholer countered that it had no 
such disclosure duty, and indeed that the OTS's charge was a "completely 
groundless ... attempt ... to create and apply new standard's [sic] for attorney 
conduct that are different from, and inconsistent with, generally accepted 
professional standards and ethical obligations for lawyers representing a 
client.,,228 The OTS, in response, claimed that FIRREA retroactively imposes 
on a bank's counsel a duty to regulators as well as to the clienr29 and that 
Kaye, Scholer should have complied with that duty when representing 
Lincoln-even though it was not then law.230 
This controversy was settled and never adjudicated on the merits.231 
Commentators, however, see it as emblematic of politicized abuse of 
retroactive law by the highest levels of govemment.232 
227. Id. at 419-20. 
228. Id. at 420. 
229. Under FIRREA, attorneys advising federally insured depository institutions are regarded 
as "institution-affiliated parties." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (2005). The OTS, under its then-Chief 
Counsel Harris Weinstein, relied in part on that provision to conclude that such attorneys owe, and 
retrospectively have owed, a fiduciary obligation to those institutions. Joseph E. Addiego, III, 
Comment, FIRREA Disrupts Traditional Notions of Attorney Duty by Exposing Lawyers, as 
Financial Institution-Affiliated Parties, to Personal Liability, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 969, 971 
(1993); see also id. at 973 (observing that "[t]he passage ofFIRREA changed, or at least modified, 
the existing law regarding attorneys' fiduciary duties"); id. at 978 ("By including attorneys as 
institution-affiliated parties, FIRREA exposes attorneys to personal liability when a depository 
fails."). 
230. The author states this from personal experience as a Kaye, Scholer partner at that time. 
231. Kaye, Scholer did not have the opportunity to contest the OTS's action because, in 
connection with the action, the OTS froze the law firm's assets without opportunity for a prior 
hearing. The OTS imposed the freeze by issuing a temporary cease-and-desist order under 12 
U.S.C. § 1818(b}-(c). JAcKSON & SYMONS, supra note 226, at 421. Some question the OTS's 
authority to even issue this order. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULA nON OF 
BANK. FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTMTIES 640 (2004) (noting the allegation of one academic that the 
temporary cease-and-desist order was issued by the OTS to "bludgeon [Kaye, Scholer] so they 
wouldn't have to prove the allegations" against the firm). Kaye, Scholer had no realistic choice but 
to settle immediately: any administrative hearing probably would have taken months. See JACKSON 
& SYMONS, supra note 226, at 421 (noting that administrative hearings commonly drag on for 
months). Moreover, the law firm's banks-as a result of the OTS's regulatory action-had declared 
a material adverse change, suspending the firm's lines of credit needed to pay salaries and other 
current expenses. The author states this from personal experience as a Kaye, Scholer partner at that 
time. 
232. See, e.g., JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 226, at 420. Jackson and Symons quote 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, a leading legal-ethics expert, noting: 
Kaye, Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical conduct and professional 
responsibility, and Kaye, Scholer acted in accord with its duties under the law. The 
disclosures and representations that the OTS alleges should have been made by Kaye, 
Scholer in fact would have violated the standards of ethical conduct and professional 
responsibility generally recognized in its role as litigation counsel. 
Id.; see also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 200, at 345 ("Wasn't it particularly unfair for the OTS 
to take after Kaye, Scholer without giving formal advance warning that it intended to hold law firms 
representing thrift institutions to a different standard than the traditional standard of adversary 
representation in which law firms have traditionally engaged? ... [By] targeting lawyers, the OTS 
managed to do battle with a group even less popular than itself and to create the impression that it 
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F or these reasons-the potential for abuse and the lack of certainty and 
objectivity needed to structure business and financial transactions-
retroactivity should be frowned on. Even more so in the context of legal 
opinions, retroactivity should not be used as a basis to impose liability on 
opining lawyers.233 Opining lawyers, unlike companies relying on their 
advice, are professionals. As such, they are not (at least under today's norms) 
the ultimate guarantors of legality but, instead, experts in a learned body of 
knowledge.234 If that knowledge later changes-and especially if it changes 
unpredictably-the lawyer would still have complied with all professional 
obligations when rendering the opinion. That is all a lawyer can do.235 Legal 
opinions, and the lawyers giving them, therefore should not be criticized solely 
because a change in positive law makes the transaction opined on retroactively 
unlawful. 
5. Statement of the Framework. -Having resolved these ancillary issues, 
it is now possible to articulate the complete normative framework. Lawyers 
should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate lawful structured-
finance transactions. By "lawful," I mean that neither the lawyer's opinion-
giving nor, to the extent set forth below, the transaction being opined on is 
illegal or unethical as a matter of positive law-nor, ideally, do they violate 
[the OTS] was not to blame for the continuing crisis in the banking industry."); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the 
Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. IllS, 
1138 (1993) (concluding that the OTS took its regulatory action because it "needed a convenient, 
unpopular scapegoat that it could confront with a dramatic gesture designed to help it regain its 
prestige"). 
233. Recall that this Article uses the term "liability" to include any form of governmental 
constraints, including civil liability, criminal liability, and suspension or termination of the license 
to practice law. See supra note 128. 
234. See Guidelines, supra note 50, at 875 (stating that opinions serve to "provid[e] the 
recipient with the opinion giver's professional judgment on legal issues concerning the opinion 
giver's client, the transaction, or both, that the recipient has determined to be important in 
connection with the transaction"); Legal Opinion PrinCiples, supra note 62, at 832 (maintaining that 
legal opinions are "expressions of professional judgment regarding the legal matters addressed and 
not guarantees that a court will reach any particular result"). Cf Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1896 
(stating that "it should be understood that an opinion is not a guaranty, but merely a lawyer's 
informed judgment as to a specific question oflaw"). 
235. As a practical matter, legal opinions sometimes explicitly state that they are limited to the 
law in effect on the date the opinion is given. Cf STERBA, supra note 51, § 2.13 ("[S]ome lawyers 
wiJI state in their opinions that they 'assume no responsibility to communicate with you with 
reference to changes which may occur subsequent to the date hereof.'''). Although primarily 
intended to put the opinion recipient on notice that counsel has no duty to update the opinion if the 
law changes, this statement in an opinion would also have the incidental benefit of clarifying, 
essentially as a matter of contract, that counsel is not responsible for a later retroactive change in 
law. Id; see also TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 662 (with respect to no-violation-of-law 
opinions, "the opinion covers only those laws (including published rules and regulations) in effect 
on the date of the opinion letter and laws and published rules and regulations adopted on that date 
that by their terms are to take effect while the Company is performing its obligations under the 
agreement"). 
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nonns-at the time the opinion is issued.236 In assessing whether a transaction 
is lawful, the lawyer should examine at least the portion of the transaction 
relating to the opinion. If, however, in the course of that examination the 
lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should investigate further before 
issuing the opinion. What constitutes a warning sign should be decided by 
courts on a case-by-case basis because warning signs are more easily 
recognized than defined. In appropriate cases, the lawyer may want to obtain, 
as part of the due diligence investigation, an opinion from in-house counsel 
stating that the overall transaction does not violate law. Failure of in-house 
counsel to render such an opinion would signal a problem. 
Is this framework, which imposes relatively minimal constraints on 
structured-fmance opinions and the lawyers issuing them, preferable to 
potentially more restrictive frameworks? In the post-Enron regulatory 
environment, for example, scholars have vigorously criticized lawyer conduct, 
suggesting the need for greater constraints.237 My analysis, however, 
implicitly has demonstrated that this framework is superior to, or at least 
equally efficient as, other potential frameworks. Structured-finance opinions 
are an efficient means of facilitating lawful structured-fmance transactions.238 
Lawful structured-finance transactions are themselves, on balance, efficient, 
fair, and economically desirable.239 The only deficiency in these 
transactions--occasional infonnation failure--occurs independent of lawyer 
conduct and has solutions that are likewise independent.240 Therefore, any 
framework for issuing structured-fmance opinions that imposes greater 
constraints on lawyer conduct than this Article's framework would impose 
costs that yield no real benefit. 
Moreover, as vigorously as scholars have criticized lawyer conduct,241 the 
scholarship often does not propose actual legal constraints on, but merely 
236. Where the transaction being opined on is lawful as a matter of positive law but nonetheless 
may violate norms, the lawyer may want to exercise special caution in issuing the opinion. 
237. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. 
238. See text accompanying supra note 125 (discussing that these opinions facilitate structured-
finance transactions in an efficient way by targeting the precise two elements of information 
asymmetry of concern to investors); see also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing 
why the scope of due diligence proposed by this Article's framework is optimal); supra notes 179-
98 (same). 
239. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 153-73 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 150, at 1252 (condemning a system of legal ethics that 
"enabled lawyers to become complicitous in client actions that defrauded the public"); Koniak, 
supra note I, at 1240 (alleging that "the involvement of lawyers was necessary to implement" 
various aspects of corporate fraud); see also Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of 
Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 557 (1994) (suggesting that by 
ignoring the moral interdependence between lawyers and clients, lawyers "further entangle 
themselves in clients' moral quagmires and [may] expose themselves to legal liability as well"). 
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aspirational goals for, such conduct.242 And where the scholarship does 
propose legal constraints, they are often impracticae43 and not demonstrably 
preferable to this Article's framework, which, by following the social-ordering 
paradigm, should achieve an optimal public outcome overall.244 
I next illustrate the framework's application by examining several 
different hypothetical scenarios. In that context, I also examine how the 
framework would apply when the assumption that the legal opinion is correct 
is relaxed. 
6. Applying the Framework.-Consider ftrst how this Article's 
framework would apply to a technically correct structured-fmance opinion 
delivered in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction, which subsequently collapses, 
leaving shareholders of the originator with huge losses as a result of contingent 
recourse that wipes out most of their equity. Because lawyers should have the 
right to issue opinions that help facilitate structured-ftnance transactions that 
are neither illegal nor unethical as a matter of positive law at the time the 
opinion is issued, this opinion should not be subject to criticism, and the 
lawyer issuing it should not be subject to liability. Notwithstanding the 
shareholders' losses, lawyers are not, and should not be, ultimate guarantors of 
a transaction's success.245 
The foregoing assumes that the lawyer examined at least the portion of 
the transaction relating to the opinion. If, however, in the course of that 
examination the lawyer spotted appropriate warning signs, such as in-house 
counsel's failure to render a requested no-violation-of-Iaw opinion, and did not 
investigate further, the lawyer should be subject to criticism if not liability-
notwithstanding the structured-ftnance opinion being technically correct. 
The same analysis would apply to a technically correct structured-ftnance 
opinion delivered in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction, which subsequently 
collapses, leaving shareholders of the originator with huge losses as a result of 
contingent recourse that wipes out most of their equity. Even though, as 
discussed below,246 Sarbanes-Oxley might impose securities law liability for 
242. See Painter, supra note 241, at 511-18 (arguing that, at least as a moral matter, lawyers 
sometimes should second guess their corporate clients). 
243. Compare Griffith, supra note ISO, at 1232 (arguing that a lawyer should be responsible for 
seeking outcomes that "are optimal from the perspective of the public generally, not merely from a 
particular client's point of view"), with id. at 1233 (admitting that his proposal "seem[s] a bit 
abstract"). Although Professor Griffith subsequently argues that his proposal could be applied to an 
actual case by having investors stand in for the "public," the example he uses appears internally 
inconsistent as to whether those investors are investors in the originator or the SPY. Id. at 1237-39. 
244. Under that paradigm, parties left to independent bargaining work out arrangements that, 
except to the extent the arrangements create unlawful externalities, overall benefit the social good. 
See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. Cf TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 596 
("An opinion is not a guaranty ofan outcome, but rather an expression of professional judgment."). 
246. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text. 
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mere negligence, the hypothetical assumes that the structured-finance opinion 
is technically correct; thus, there is no negligence. The opining lawyer 
therefore will not, and-because lawyers are not ultimate guarantors of a 
transaction's success-should not, be liable. Shareholders nonetheless may be 
able to recover losses from the originator's officers and directors to the extent 
the contingent recourse was fraudulently concealed.247 
Now relax the framework's assumption that the legal opinion is 
technically correct. For this purpose, again break the analysis into two parts: 
an incorrect structured-fmance opinion delivered in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
transaction, and one delivered in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction. In both 
cases, I will assume that opining counsel intended to give a correct opinion but 
1· 248 was neg Igent. 
In the former case,249 the framework itself need not change, even though 
it was constructed under the assumption that the opinion is correct. The 
framework only need recognize existing liability standards for rendering 
incorrect opinions. Negligence law, and lawyer liability thereunder, provide a 
significant incentive to motivate opining counsel to strive for a correct 
opinion.25o Reputational cost provides an important additional incentive.251 In 
cases where these incentives fail, damages assessed against opining counsel 
ought to compensate the originator's shareholders for any losses resulting from 
the incorrect opinion.252 
247. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text (discussing § 303 ofSarbanes-Oxley). 
248. Where opining counsel intends to give an incorrect opinion, the inherent fraud is obviously 
problematic (and beyond the scope of this Article). 
249. This case assumes, as discussed in text accompanying supra note 215, that Sarbanes-
Oxley is not retroactive. 
250. One commentator argues: 
[T]he real value added by the threat oflegalliability may be (or at least has been) in 
terrorem, and not directly traceable to actual cases holding lawyers liable. "[T]he fact 
that there aren't a lot of cases to hold lawyers liable," one attorney [being interviewed 
by the commentator] observed, "and there isn't a lot of experience of lawyers being 
sued, doesn't mean that people aren't fearful of it nevertheless. It's like fastening your 
seatbelt on an airplane. I don't know anyone who's been through a plane crash much 
less someone who has been through a crash who would not have survived if they 
weren't wearing their seatbelt. Nevertheless, I buckle my belt low and firm across the 
lap." 
Lipson, supra note 60, at 76-77. 
251. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers 
and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 411-12 (2004) (observing that lawyers and other professional 
gatekeepers "involved in corporate scandals ... face loss of reputation, the very asset that allows 
[them] to sell their services to issuers in the first place. These 'market reputation' and 'litigation' 
corrections ... may be as effective as, if not more effective than, regulation"); see also Lipson, 
supra note 60, at 76-77 (arguing that "it may not be rational to worry about liability, but the 
conservatism engendered by anxiety ultimately produces better quality practice" and "[t]he fact that 
the opinion creates the potential for liability takes up slack that might otherwise plague a lawyered 
transaction"). 
252. See supra note 148. 
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In the latter case (an incorrect structured-finance opinion delivered in a 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley transaction), this same rationale should apply even more 
strongly because opining counsel not only would be liable under negligence 
law and subject to reputational costs but also might be liable under Sarbanes-
Oxley, which exposes counsel to securities-law penalties.253 Section 303 of 
that Acf54 directs the SEC to adopt rules making it illegal for officers and 
directors of issuers of securities, or any persons acting under their direction, to 
"fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead" any independent 
public or certified accountant auditing the issuer's financial statements "for the 
purpose of rendering such fmancial statements materially misleading.,,255 The 
SEC consequently issued Rule 13b2_2,256 which provides in relevant part that 
"[ n]o ... person acting under the direction [of an issuer's officers or directors] 
shall directly or indirectly take any action to ... mislead" any such accountant 
"if that person knew or should have known that such action, if successful, 
could result in rendering the issuer's fmancial statements materially 
misleading.,,257 The SEC Release accompanying issuance of that rule makes it 
clear that persons acting under such direction could, in appropriate 
circumstances, include attorneys,258 and even could include attorneys who 
merely negligently issue "an inaccurate or misleading legal analysis" on which 
any such accountant is permitted to rely.259 This means that an attorney 
negligently issuing an inaccurate true sale or nonconsolidation opinion might 
be violating Rule 13b2-2 if an accountant is allowed to rely on that opinion to 
fmd, under GAAP, that the transaction in question is off-balance-sheet. 
253. Penalties under Rule 13b2-2, which implements Sarbanes-Oxley § 303, include cease-
and-desist orders, injunctions, and civil or criminal penalties. See, e.g., In re John K. Bradley, 
Exchange Act Release No. 46035 (June 5, 2002), 2002 SEC LEXIS 1448 (imposing a § 21C cease-
and-desist order). 
254. Section 303 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2005). 
255. 15 U.S.C. § 7242(a). 
256. 17 C.F .R. § 240.13b2-2 (2005). 
257. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1). 
258. Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 47890 (May 20, 
2003),2003 WL 21148349, at 3. 
259. Id. at 4, 6. The SEC Release is somewhat ambivalent as to whether, in addition to mere 
negligence, any degree of scienter will be required to violate Rule 13b2-2. See id. at 4, which notes: 
[S]ome commentators noted that a misleading legal analysis should violate the rule 
only if accompanied by fraudulent or 'bad' intent on the part of the attorney providing 
the analysis. These comments would appear to be based on the premise that in the past 
the Commission has not addressed the negligent communication of misleading 
information to auditors .... To the contrary, for many years we have initiated 
enforcement actions against those who, by negligently providing misleading 
confirmations to auditors, cause an issuer to violate the financial reporting or books 
and records provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... We believe that 
third parties providing information or analyses to an auditor should exercise reasonable 
attention and care in those communications [although] [w]e do not intend to hold any 
party accountable for honest and reasonable mistakes. 
(citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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In a sense, § 303 of Sarbanes-Oxley illustrates this Article's contention 
that where lawyers facilitate lawful transactions that create problematic 
externalities, the focus should be on legally prohibiting those transactions.26o 
Section 303 effectively declares unlawful, as a matter of positive law, mis-
leading off-balance-sheet transactions. Rule 13b2-2 might be viewed as 
undercutting that contention, though, to the extent it imposes securities-law 
penalties on lawyers that merely negligently facilitate misleading off-balance-
sheet transactions. I believe, however, that Rule 13b2-2 may go too far. 
Although the Rule's higher securities-law penalty arguably will motivate 
lawyers to increase their due diligence when issuing structured-fmance 
opinions, these opinions are rarely incorrecr61 because negligence law and 
reputational cost already significantly motivate opining counsel to strive for 
correct opinions.262 Moreover, third parties injured by incorrect opinions 
already should be compensated.263 Therefore, it is unclear whether the cost of 
increased due diligence is justified.264 
As a reality check, compare how the framework would apply to a 
hypothetical scenario analyzed, in a separate context, by Professor Gordon. He 
contends that lawyers should not facilitate client transactions that, though 
"technically legal," are "likely to bring destruction in [their] wake.,,265 This 
certainly appears sensible: Where a lawyer believes a transaction is likely to 
bring destruction, the lawyer probably should not facilitate that transaction. 
As a practical matter, however, Professor Gordon's view is not inconsistent 
with this Article's framework. If the destruction is to the client itself/66 only 
an immense judgment gap between management and counsel could produce a 
scenario where the former believe a transaction is desirable but the latter 
believes it is likely to bring destruction. And, if the destruction is to third 
parties, Professor Gordon's hypothetical could arise only in a legal system in 
260. Cf Blackwood, supra note 152 (arguing that LBOs should come within the purview of 
fraudulent conveyance law, protecting unsecured creditors in the event that an unsuccessful LBO 
ends up in bankruptcy, thereby mitigating negative externalities created by transactional lawyers 
who facilitate debt-laden (and, perhaps, economically unsound) but legal LBO transactions). 
261. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
264. This is true even to the extent that one argues that increased due diligence is needed, 
irrespective of cost, because incorrect structured-finance opinions potentially impact large numbers 
of investors and public-market integrity. Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 418 (arguing that "the 
lawyer's 'responsibility must broaden and deepen' as more individuals find it increasingly 
necessary to rely upon his expertise" (quoting Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 
491 P.2d 421, 432-33 (Cal. 1971»). Willfulness, scienter, or recklessness is normally required to 
impose securities-law penalties. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) 
(holding that "a private cause of action for damages will [not] lie under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in 
the absence of any allegation of 'scienter' -intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"). 
265. Gordon, supra note 78, at 1207. 
266. This is the scenario that Gordon envisions. See id. 
48 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:1 
which the transaction causing the destruction is neither unlawfuf67 nor subjects 
the client to liability.268 The framework therefore satisfies this reality check. 
The framework also has predictive utility. Consider, for example, 
whether the holding in United States v. Simon should be extended to lawyers 
providing legal opinions.269 The lawyer is not then advocating for a client but, 
rather, predicting as accurately as possible the legal outcome of a given factual 
scenario. The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers even comments that a 
lawyer's duty to third-party-opinion recipients "is to provide a fair and 
objective opinion,,270 -essentially the same standard that an accountant has in 
certifying financial statements.271 In principle, therefore, the United States v. 
Simon holding should be as applicable to opining lawyers as to accountants.272 
Nonetheless, this Article's framework suggests a distinction in how that 
holding should apply. In contrast to an accountant whose responsibility is to 
fairly present financial statements, the opining lawyer's sole duty is to present 
an accurate, fair, and objective opinion on the legal matters the opinion covers. 
A lawyer rendering an accurate opinion that fairly and objectively presents 
those legal matters should not-absent knowledge, or the existence of warning 
signs that would lead to knowledge, of the wrongful nature of the accountant's 
conducr73-be subject to liability under United States v. Simon.274 
267. If the transaction is unlawful, the lawyer could not provide the requested opinion in the 
first place. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. 
268. If the transaction subjects the client to liability, third parties could sue, thereby transferring 
the costs of the destruction from them to the client. Then we would be under the remote prior 
scenario, where the client's management believes a transaction is desirable but counsel believes it is 
likely to bring destruction. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
269. Cf supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Simon). 
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c (2000). 
271. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. Cf Gordon, supra note 78, at 1194 
(questioning whether corporate lawyers are truly like advocates whose duties are only to the client, 
as opposed to like auditors whose duties are to the public); Painter, supra note 251, at 398 (arguing 
that "[e]thics rules are becoming increasingly similar for auditors and securities lawyers," although 
there are "differences"). 
272. Cf Freeman, supra note 26, at 389 (arguing that "it is in the rendition of formal opinions 
that the services performed by the two professions [law and accounting] shade together and become 
indistinguishable"-such as the role provided by a bond-counsel legal opinion, though also 
cautioning that one cannot compare a legal opinion to an auditor's certification "without regard to 
the setting in which the legal opinion is rendered"). Cf United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 
863 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting that in "our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's 
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the 
crowbar"). 
273. This Article's "knowledge" standard may well require more of the attorney than existing 
positive-law ethical requirements. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 94 cmt. g (2000), which states: 
[Wlhen a lawyer's state of knowledge is relevant, in the absence of circumstances 
indicating otherwise, a lawyer may assume that a client will use the lawyer's counsel 
for proper purposes. Mere suspicion on the part of the lawyer that the client might 
intend to commit a crime or fraud is not knowledge .... [A] lawyer is not required to 
make a particular kind of investigation in order to ascertain more certainly what the 
facts are, although it will often be prudent for the lawyer to do so. 
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To illustrate this, consider the difficult case where a lawyer renders an 
accurate structured-finance opinion that fairly and objectively presents the 
bankruptcy-law matters that the opinion purports to cover (true sale and 
nonconsolidation), knowing that the sole purpose of the transaction is to 
achieve off-balance-sheet accounting results under GAAP (and to thereby 
avoid the adverse effect on stock price of the disclosure that otherwise would 
take place). If this constitutes knowledge of wrongful conduct, the lawyer 
should be subject to liability. There is nothing per se wrongful, however, about 
a company engaging in a transaction to achieve accounting results that are 
permitted under GAAP, which sets accounting standards officially recognized 
as authoritative by the SEC.275 Moreover, except as noted below,276 the fact 
that a company engages in such a transaction should not, in and of itself, 
constitute a warning sign if the company is advised by certified public 
accountants. A lawyer ought to be able to assume that such accountants will 
comply with GAAP277 unless on notice otherwise.278 To the extent society 
deems it inappropriate for companies to engage in transactions whose sole 
purpose is to achieve off-balance-sheet accounting results under GAAP, the 
solution-assuming reputational cost is an insufficient deterrenr79-is either to 
make those engagements unlawful or to restrict what is permitted as off-
balance-sheet accounting under G~80 and not to constrain lawyers from 
helping to facilitate lawful transactions.281 
274. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra notes 37, 102--03 and accompanying text. Indeed, companies routinely engage 
in transactions primarily, if not solely, to achieve accounting results that are permitted under GAAP, 
such as selling assets and using the proceeds to repay debt, thereby reducing leverage. See Linda A. 
MacDonald, Principles-Based Approach to Standard Setting, The FASB Report, Nov. 27, 2002, 
available at http://www.fasb.orglprojectlprinciples-based_approach.shtml (noting that past 
accounting rules have been so detailed and rules-based as to allow financial engineering with an aim 
towards achieving a desired accounting result). . 
276. See infra note 280. 
277. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2)(b) (2000) (stating 
that a lawyer should not be disciplined "when the lawyer reasonably believes ... that the client can 
assert a nonfrivolous argument that the client's conduct will not constitute a crime or fraud"). The 
client's argument in the text above would indeed be nonfrivolous: that its accounting will remain in 
compliance with GAAP. See also Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 10, at 1315-17 (proposing that 
even transactions designed solely to achieve accounting results should not be presumptively 
unlawful). 
278. That notice is unlikely to arise as a result of the lawyer's independent understanding of 
GAAP because knowledge about, much less expertise in, GAAP is well beyond the learning of most 
attorneys. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. The textual analysis above of course 
assumes, where a transaction is facilitating fraud, that opining counsel neither knows nor reasonably 
should know of the fraud. See supra notes 26, 179-94 and accompanying text. 
279. To some extent, the problem will be self-correcting where reputational costs penalize 
companies that engage in these transactions. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 20 & n.120 
(observing this reputational cost, in the form of falling stock prices, of companies engaging in 
earnings-management transactions). 
280. Indeed, on June 15, 2005, the SEC staff released its report on off-balance-sheet 
transactions, REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(c) OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL 
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This approach is sensible. It respects the social-ordering paradigm while 
recognizing that controlling management action is, and should be, primarily an 
internal governance issue, not a general monitoring function of outside 
lawyers. Corporate governance principles require management to maximize 
shareholder value. To the extent transactions structured to achieve accounting 
results ultimately hurt the company's shareholders, one of four things may be 
happening. The transaction may have appeared, ex ante, to be positive-value 
but turned out to be negative-value-a bad judgment call for which no law that 
respects managerial discretion can provide complete protection and as to which 
corporate-governance systems in the United States (if not abroad) generally 
follow the business-judgment rule to provide managerial discretion?82 Or 
management may be biased due to manufactured conflicts of interest, as in 
Enron, a scenario separately addressed by the solution that management be 
required to be free of material conflicts of interest stemming from complex 
transactions for which disclosure may be insufficient.283 Management also 
may be biased due to the inherent conflict of interest that stock price is the 
principal criterion by which management's performance is judged. This bias, 
however, does not mean that accounting-motivated transactions should be 
necessarily unlawful. Even though corporate governance principles require 
management to maximize shareholder value, there is a temporal conflict 
between current and future shareholders: disclosure of a possible risk harms a 
company's current shareholders, whereas failure to disclose the risk may harm 
the company's future shareholders.284 On which audience should disclosure be 
focused? Corporation law provides that management's sole duty is to current 
PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf. The Report focused, among other things, on 
whether financial statements of issuers of securities transparently reflect the economics of off-
balance-sheet arrangements. Id. The Report recommended that "transactions and transaction 
structures primarily motivated by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics" be 
discouraged through a combination of changes to accounting standards by F ASB and greater 
awareness by participants in the financial reporting process. Id. at 3. In this latter context, the 
Report suggested, consistent with the Simon case (though not citing it), that technical compliance 
with financial reporting requirements would be unsatisfactory when investors are nonetheless 
misled or have insufficient information to understand the issuer's activities. Id. The Report 
questioned nuanced approaches to accounting disclosure because "financial structures are virtually 
limitless and continue to evolve at a rapid pace." Id. at 46. Instead, it suggested that "improvement 
in transparency and comparability across issuers can perhaps most directly and quickly be 
accomplished by eliminating the use of such structured transactions" whose sole (or perhaps even 
primary) purpose is motivated by accounting treatment. Id. 
281. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
282. See In re Abbott Labs Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2003) 
("Where there is no conflict of interest or no facts suggesting suspect motivation, it is difficult to 
charge directors with responsibility for corporate losses for an alleged breach of care. "). 
283. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
284. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between 
Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1044 (2005) (discussing this temporal conflict). 
Future shareholders could be harmed if, after they purchase their shares, the undisclosed risk occurs, 
causing share prices to fall. 
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shareho1ders;285 they, unlike future shareholders, would likely benefit from 
accounting-motivated transactions.286 
Where, however, management is simply defrauding shareholders, there 
are far more systematic monitors than opining counsel (though any opining 
counsel that becomes aware of the fraud would, of course, have to report it). 287 
In-house counsel are in a better position to monitor because they generally 
have more information about the company and its business goals288 and also 
because, as employees, they are not normally engaged to work only on discrete 
transactions.289 Many in-house legal staffs have attorneys specifically 
dedicated to corporate compliance with law?90 The company's accountants, of 
course, also serve as additional monitors.291 
This is not to say that opining counsel should not act as monitors. To the 
extent discussed/92 they should serve as monitors of transactional lawfolness, 
285. Id. at 1049 (demonstrating that "[d]irectors and management, at least in the United States, 
have a fiduciary duty only to investors holding an existing property right or equitable interest to 
support such a duty-i.e., current investors" (citing Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 
1988))) (emphasis added). 
286. This responds, solely for illustrative purposes, to a nonnative question (on which audience 
should disclosure be focused?) with a positive-law answer. In this context, I recognize that federal 
securities law, which would preempt inconsistent state corporation law, sometimes may impose 
duties to future as well as current shareholders. See Schwarcz, supra note 284. So long as 
management is able to certify fair presentation under § 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, I am 
unaware of any securities-law precedent that would make it unlawful for management to engage in a 
GAAP-pennitted transaction. I also would be skeptical of any such precedent so long as GAAP 
rules are promulgated pursuant to SEC delegation of power. See supra note 37 and accompanying 
text. 
287. See supra notes 98, 179-94 and accompanying text. 
288. Once upon a time, outside counsel were, for the most part, both corporate and transactional 
counsel. Lawyers working on corporate matters then would work hand in hand with, or sometimes 
be the same as, the lawyers working on transactions. As legal fees have risen, companies have 
brought the more routine corporate counsel work in-house and engage outside finns primarily, ifnot 
exclusively, for sophisticated transactional work. See, e.g., James S. Wilbur, The Inside Track to 
Cost Containment, AM. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 40 (observing that "toward the end of the 1980s general 
counsel ... add[ed] lawyers to in-house staffs and [limited] the amount and types of legal matters 
being referred outside"). 
289. Indeed, at the March 21,2005 Columbia Law School Symposium on this Article, Sullivan 
& Cromwell Partner Rebecca Simmons observed that a strong intemallegal department can help to 
see the overall picture and ensure that all the advice is coherent. 
290. See In-House Counsel Must Lead Corporate Compliance Efforts, II CORP. LEGAL TIMES, 
Issue 114, at 18 (May 2001) (stating that "[ c ]orporate compliance is one of the key roles" that in-
house counsel perfonns). This trend follows the recognition that board-of-director duties 
"embrace[] some responsibility to determine 'that the corporation's information and reporting 
systems are in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will 
come to its attention in a timely manner.'" William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: 
Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. REG. I, 25 (2005) (quoting In re 
Caremark In1'l, Inc., Delivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
291. This monitoring is increased when certified public accountants approve the accounting 
result sought by the company as complying with GAAP. Cf supra note 277 and accompanying text 
(noting that lawyers may reasonably rely on an accountant's assertion of GAAP compliance to 
avoid disciplinary sanctions). 
292. See supra notes 178-94 and accompanying text. 
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with an intrinsically unlawful transaction being the ultimate warning sign.293 
Transactional lawfulness, however, should not be conflated with corporate 
lawfulness: whether the transaction would be lawful if (or as) engaged in by 
the particular client-company. A transaction can be lawful on its face-there is 
nothing intrinsically unlawful, for example, about accounting transactions that 
comply with GAAP-but unlawful if engaged in by that company. If the 
transaction is not intrinsically unlawful, only counsel with full information of 
the company-in-house counsel-are in a position to effectively judge 
corporate lawfulness. 
This Article has focused primarily on the duties of lawyers issuing 
opinions in, as opposed to structuring, transactions. In principle, the Article's 
overall framework should hold even if opining counsel also helps structure the 
transaction. As structuring counsel, the lawyer is acting more like an advocate 
for the client and therefore would be responsible under traditional rules of 
lawyer ethics?94 As opining counsel, the lawyer additionally should be subject 
to the constraints discussed in this Article. The practical consequence is that 
opining counsel that also helps structure the transaction is necessarily more 
exposed to the transaction's entirety and thus has more opportunity to come 
across warning signs. This does not necessarily mean that such counsel will, 
or should, know everything about the transaction and be able to spot all 
warning signs. The client, for example, may ask counsel to help structure the 
transaction subject to certain business assumptions. If these assumptions are 
reasonable, there is no reason why counsel should not be able to proceed?95 
The client also may not tell counsel every facet of how the transaction fits into 
the company's larger financial picture. Again, so long as counsel sees a 
business purpose, counsel should be able to proceed.296 Where a warning sign 
is spotted, of course, counsel should be subject to the duties discussed 
elsewhere in this Article.297 
This Article so far has built and tested a framework for analyzing the 
duties of lawyers issuing structured-fmance opinions. I next examine the 
extent to which that frarnework applies to, or informs, the duties of lawyers 
issuing other types of third-party legal opinions in business and financial 
transactions (hereinafter referred to as third-party business-law opinions). 
293. Recall that opining counsel should assess the transaction's lawfulness by examining at 
least the portion thereof relating to the opinion. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. If, in 
the course of that examination, the lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should investigate further 
before issuing the opinion. See also supra notes 98, 179-94 and accompanying text (discussing 
warning signs). 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32. Normative analysis of traditional rules for 
lawyers acting as advocates is beyond this Article's scope. 
295. Reasonable business assumptions themselves should not constitute warning signs. See 
supra text accompanying note 186. 
296. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 95-98, 179-94 and accompanying text. 
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B. What Constraints Should Bind Other Types of Third-Party Business-Law 
Opinions and the Lawyers Issuing Them? 
The framework turns out to have significant applicability to the duties of 
lawyers issuing any type of third-party business-law opinion. This can be seen 
by reexamining the assumptions and logic of the analysis underlying the 
framework. 
Those assumptions began with the following: structured-finance opinions 
are technically correct as to the matters they cover, address only bankruptcy-
law matters (and make no accounting analysis), and are not intended by 
opining counsel to achieve misleading accounting results or otherwise mislead 
the pUblic.298 Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that third-party business-law 
opinions generally are technically correct as to the matters they cover,299 
address only legal matters (and make no accounting analysis), and are not 
intended by opining counsel to achieve misleading accounting results or 
otherwise mislead the public. 
The reasons that government might impose constraints on third-party 
business-law opinions likewise appear similar to the reasons that government 
might impose constraints on structured-fmance opinions. Except to the extent 
already bound up with market efficiency or externalities, third-party business-
law opinions are unlikely to impact social welfare, problems of the 
"commons," allocative fairness, morals, or nonns. Paternalism should not be a 
basis for imposing constraints to the extent, as is customary, the third-party 
business-law opinions are issued in a sophisticated business and finance 
context.300 Market efficiency should not justify constraints because third-party 
business-law opinions, by reducing infonnation asymmetry, appear to be an 
efficient means of helping to facilitate business and financial transactions, 
which, under the social-ordering paradigm, in turn fosters efficiency.30! 
The principal basis, therefore, for government to impose constraints on 
third-party business-law opinions appears to be, as with structured-finance 
opinions, to protect against externalities.302 Any time a lawyer issues a third-
party business-law opinion, the lawyer potentially creates externalities. If, 
however, lawyers were constrained from providing those opinions, they would 
298. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
299. I later relax the assumption that the legal opinion is correct. See infra subpart III(B). 
300. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 50, at 595 (discussing opinion letters in "substantial 
business transactions"); Easier Path, supra note 42, at 1894 ("Legal opinions are ... an integral and 
appropriate part of a wide variety of corporate, commercial and financing transactions."). This 
Article will assume such a sophisticated context, recognizing that there may be differences in the 
rare cases where such opinions are issued outside of that context. 
30 I. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
302. This Article's examination of the extent to which externalities caused by third-party 
business-law opinions justify constraints is, as with structured-finance opinions, tempered by the 
recognition that opinion-giving externalities are different from the externalities resulting from 
traditional lawyering because the opining lawyer's goal-to accurately predict a given legal state by 
applying law to fact-is closer to accounting goals than to the goals of traditional legal advocacy. 
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be forced to substitute their judgment about externalities for that of their clients 
even though, from an information standpoint, their clients generally have more 
and better information about the consequences of transactions. As in the case 
of structured-finance opinions, imposing a duty on lawyers to second-guess 
their clients' business decisions would be inefficient and probably even 
unworkable in practice.303 
This presumes that third-party business-law opinions are accurate and 
thus do not distort transactional arrangements. That is a reasonable 
presumption because most such opinions are considerably less complex than 
structured-finance opinions.304 Moreover, the information failure sometimes 
associated with structured-fmance transactions-the masking of liabilities that 
only first become evident when a company goes bankrupeo5-is not usually 
associated with other types of third-party business-law opinions.306 
Subject to these limitations, therefore, lawyers should have the right to 
issue third-party business-law opinions that help facilitate lawful transactions. 
The two ancillary issues related to issuance of structured-finance opinions still 
must be resolved, however, in this broader context. The first such issue was 
whether, in assessing lawfulness, attorneys should examine the entire 
transaction or just the portion thereof relating to the opinion. 
Although attorneys ideally should examine an entire transaction, this 
appears unwarranted from a cost-benefit standpoint if only a portion of the 
transaction needs to be examined to render the requested opinion.307 As 
before, there are at least two ways to curtail externalities without requiring 
counsel to examine the entire transaction. A minimalist approach is to permit 
counsel to assume legality if the portion of the transaction relevant to their 
opinion is lawful and, in the course of preparing due diligence for their 
opinion, they do not spot warning signs putting them on notice of problems. 
When, however, they do spot warning signs/o8 they should investigate further 
before issuing their opinion. The other approach is to supplement the 
minimalist approach by requiring opining counsel to obtain, in appropriate 
cases as part of their due diligence, an opinion from in-house counsel that the 
303. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing why lawyers are ill-equipped 
to assess and weigh the costs and benefits of business transactions being facilitated by their 
opinions). 
304. See supra note 28. 
305. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
306. Outside of the structured-fmance context, there are generally no dual-information 
problems. 
307. This view is increasingly realistic as outside lawyers specialize further and companies 
bring more of their day-to-day work in-house. 
308. The question of what constitutes warning signs is discussed supra notes 183-94 and 
accompanying text. That discussion should apply to any type of third-party business-law opinion. 
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overall transaction does not violate law. As before, I am agnostic as to whether 
the minimalist approach should always be supplemented in this manner.309 
The other ancillary issue concerns the meaning of lawfulness in a world 
of changing laws and norms. Because this Article's analysis of that issue does 
not turn on anything unique to structured-finance opinions,3lO such analysis 
should be applicable to any third-party business-law opinions. Applying that 
analysis, lawyers should have the right to issue third-party business-law 
opinions that facilitate transactions that do not violate positive law (although, if 
a transaction nonetheless violates norms, exercise of that right may be risky as 
a practical matter), and retroactivity should not be used as a basis to impose 
liability on opining lawyers. 
Based on the foregoing, it is possible to articulate at least an initial 
framework for analyzing the duties of lawyers when issuing third-party 
business-law opinions.3Il Lawyers should have the right to issue such opinions 
to help facilitate lawful business and fmancial transactions. Lawful means that 
neither the lawyer's opinion-giving nor, to the extent set forth below, the 
transaction is illegal or unethical as a matter of positive law at the time the 
opinion is issued. In assessing whether a transaction is lawful, the lawyer 
should examine at least the portion thereof relating to the opinion. If, in the 
course of that examination, the lawyer spots warning signs, the lawyer should 
investigate further before issuing the opinion. In appropriate cases, the lawyer 
may want to obtain, as part of the due-diligence investigation, an opinion from 
in-house counsel stating that the overall transaction does not violate law. 
Failure of in-house counsel to render such an opinion would signal a problem. 
These duties parallel the duties of a lawyer issuing structured-fmance 
opinions.3i2 To understand how these duties313 would apply, consider a typical 
third-party business-law opinion-a remedies opinion from a borrower's law 
firm to the lender, concluding that the loan agreement is enforceable against 
the borrower.314 For illustrative purposes, assume the borrower intends to use 
309. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (observing, among other things, that requiring 
a no-violation-of-law opinion would be costly and inconsistent to some extent with the existing 
norm that companies generally have no obligation to retain counsel when engaging in business 
transactions and would not be a panacea). 
310. See supra section III(A)( 4). 
311. I refer to this as an initial framework only because, outside of the structured-finance 
context, its assumptions (that the opinions are technically correct, address only bankruptcy-law 
matters, and are not intended to mislead the public) may be somewhat limiting. 
312. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (articulating a framework for analyzing those 
duties). 
313. That is, the duties of a lawyer issuing a third-party business-law opinion. 
314. See Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 181 (defming a remedies opmlOn as one 
concluding that a specified transaction document is enforceable against the client, and clarifYing 
that such opinion is the same as one concluding that such document is legal, valid, binding, and 
enforceable); id. at 198-99 (explaining the remedies opinion); id. at 221-23 (setting forth an 
illustrative opinion letter, including the remedies opinion); see generally TriBar Opinion 
Committee, Special Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee: The Remedies Opinion-Deciding 
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the loan proceeds to acquire another company and then increase that 
company's efficiency by shutting down various of its divisions and business 
lines, thereby eliminating thousands of jobs. 315 
Because lawyers should have the right to issue third-party business-law 
opinions that help facilitate transactions that are not unlawful at the time the 
opinion is issued, this opinion should not be subject to criticism and the lawyer 
issuing it should not be subject to liability. This assumes the lawyer examines 
at least the portion of the loan transaction relating to the opinion. In the case of 
a remedies opinion, this means that the lawyer should examine the loan 
agreement and also either independently establish or rely on in-house counsel 
to establish that all of the conditions necessary under contract law for the 
fonnation of a contract (e.g., execution, delivery, consideration) have occurred 
and that the borrower validly exists in good standing and has duly authorized 
the loan agreement's execution.316 If, in the course of doing this diligence, the 
lawyer spots appropriate warning signs and does not investigate further, the 
lawyer would be remiss even if the remedies opinion were technically correct. 
Even if we relax the assumption that the third-party business-law opinion 
is technically correct, this statement of an opining lawyer's duties should 
continue to apply under existing liability standards for rendering incorrect 
opinions. Assume, for example, that opining counsel intends to give a correct 
opinion but is negligent. Negligence law and lawyer liability thereunder 
already provide a significant incentive to motivate opining counsel to strive for 
a correct opinion. Reputatjonal cost provides an important additional 
incentive. And, in cases where those incentives fail, damages assessed against 
opining counsel ought to compensate the lender for losses resulting from the 
incorrect opinion. 
IV. Conclusions 
Third-party legal opinions-which are opinions directed not to clients 
but, at the request of clients, to third parties such as investors or financiers of 
credit-span the entire range of business and fmandal undertakings. Indeed, 
they are of far greater practical importance than opinions directed to clients 
When to Include Exceptions and Assumptions, 59 Bus. LAW. 1483 (2004) (describing a remedies 
opinion and the typical assumptions and inclusions, the considerations involved in determining 
inclusions, and examples of what should be included when facing certain common contractual 
provisions). 
315. This is a variant on the hypothetical discussed supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
316. See Silverado Report, supra note 50, at 198-99 (describing what a remedies opinion 
covering a transaction document entails); see also TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 314, at 
1486-87 (suggesting that writers of remedies opinions should review relevant law to determine if 
any aspect of an agreement raises legal issues affecting enforceability and whether factual inquiry 
may resolve an enforceability question). 
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because they operate to reduce information asymmetry between parties to 
transactions.317 
The scholarship and authorities governing an attorney's legal and ethical 
duties within the adversary legal system focus mostly on advocacy, and 
provide little guidance for lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions.318 In that 
capacity, lawyers do not act as advocates but must strive, in the opinion, for 
accuracy and fair presentation of legal conclusions. Because lawyers 
increasingly are being criticized and sued for issuing these OpInIOnS, 
particularly in structured-fmance transactions, there is an urgent need for 
guidance. 
This Article has attempted to derive a normative framework for analyzing 
the duties of lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions.3\9 Under this 
framework, lawyers should have the right to issue opinions that help facilitate 
transactions that are neither illegal nor unethical as a matter of positive law. In 
making this assessment, the lawyer should examine at least the portion of the 
transaction relating to the opinion. However, if appropriate warning signs 
(such as failure to see a business purpose) are spotted in the course of that 
examination,320 the lawyer should investigate further-sometimes requiring a 
no-violation-of-Iaw opinion from in-house counsel-before issuing the 
opinion. 
This framework recognizes, among other things, the fundamental 
distinction between monitoring transactional lawfulness, meaning whether the 
transaction itself is intrinsically lawful, and monitoring corporate lawfulness, 
meaning whether the transaction would be lawful if engaged in by the 
particular client-company. A transaction can be lawful on its face but unlawful 
if engaged in by that company. Because in-house counsel have, or at least 
have access to, full information of the company, they can more effectively 
monitor corporate lawfulness.321 
317. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (citing examples of when legal opinions 
would be provided to third parties and examples of their increasing use). 
318. Even lawyers' duties arising out of negligence law provide minimal guidance because, 
remarkably, lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions in structured-finance transactions are 
criticized and sued even when their opinions are technically correct. Critics argue, for example, that 
technically correct legal opinions may be misleading if they do not fairly present the situation. See 
Koppel, supra note 1, at 165-66; supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also supra text 
accompanying note 100. 
319. Although this Article focuses primarily on the duties of lawyers issuing opinions in, as 
opposed to structuring, transactions, in principle the Article's overall framework should hold even if 
opining counsel also helps to structure the transaction. See supra text accompanying notes 294-97. 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 183-94 (discussing what should constitute warning 
signs). 
321. Earlier in this Article, I asked whether the duty to the public of lawyers issuing third-party 
legal opinions is the same as the duty of an internal government lawyer to the public when writing a 
legal opinion that advises on the legality of interrogation policies for enemy detainees. See supra 
text accompanying note 36. Although not identical, that duty is remarkably similar. In neither case 
should the lawyer act as an advocate. Lawyers issuing third-party legal opinions should strive to 
accurately predict a given legal state by applying law to fact, thereby reducing information 
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Apart from this normative framework, any opmmg lawyer must be 
cognizant of hindsight bias-the reality that actions, including the issuance of 
legal opinions, are often judged ex post with a critical eye.322 Thus, "[t]he 
'nightmare' transaction for any lawyer is representing a client in a transaction 
that is subsequently held to be fraudulent. . .. Opinion givers properly worry 
that what they knew when they delivered an opinion letter will be judged with 
the benefit ofhindsight.,,323 
Because hindsight bias is exacerbated when emotions are high,324 the fact 
that legal opinions are not intended to be guarantees of particular outcomes325 
often can be lost. Indeed, at least some of the criticism of lawyers providing 
structured-finance opinions may well boil down to the flawed syllogism 
previously mentioned-the public is harmed; lawyer opinions are a sine qua 
non of the harm, and lawyers are the only deep pockets; so lawyers should be 
liable for the harm.326 Lawyers therefore must always be cautious when giving 
legal opinions to try to anticipate changing norms and to conform their conduct 
(and due diligence) accordingly, always balancing the benefits of these 
cautions against their costs. 
asymmetry between the parties. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. A government 
lawyer advising on the legality of interrogation policies similarly should strive to render 
"independent and candid advice." See David Luban, Selling Indulgences: The Unmistakable 
Parallel Between Lynn Stewart and the President's Torture Lawyers, SLATE, Feb. 14,2005, http:// 
slate.msn.comlidl211344 7 / (arguing that Y 00 and his colleagues ''were not acting as courtroom 
advocates but as legal advisers, with a different professional standard" under Model Ethics Rule 
2.1). 
322. Actions judged with the benefit of hindsight often suffer a psychological bias: the human 
tendency to exaggerate the extent to which an event that has happened could have been anticipated 
in advance. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned To Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in 
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel 
Kahneman et ai. eds., 1982) ("In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been 
anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable 
but also to view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe that 
others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case."). See also 
Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: 
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587, 587 (1994) ("Hindsight bias is the tendency for 
people with knowledge of an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome 
could have been predicted. "). 
323. FIELD, supra note 51, § 3:9, at 3-14. 
324. See Mitu Gulati et ai., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U.L. REv. 773, 774 (2004) ("In the 
context of securities regulation, hindsight can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad 
outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers."). 
325. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
326. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
